From 1928 onward, Admiral Raeder determined the navy's thinking.
For this reason, in December 1940, Grand Admiral Raeder requested that Hitler "recognize that the greatest task of the hour is concentration of all our power against Britain.
stated it was of "decisive importance".
For example, at the Nuremberg trials Admiral Raeder
was tried and condemned for the invasion of Norway.
In meetings with Admiral Raeder on 29 December 1941 and 12 January 1942, Hitler pronounced that the enemy threat to Norway required redeployment of heavy German ships as a deterrent against such a landing.
Kriegsmarine CINC Admiral Raeder and Luftwaffe CINC Reichsmarschal Goring had operational command over all their respective forces.
It was this report that enabled Admiral Raeder to get Hitler's final permission for the Tirpitz foray.
261) Carls essentially requested that Admiral Raeder issue the code word for executing the operation, with no option to cancel those orders later (Ruckrufbefehle).
Indeed, only a few postwar scholars have entered the debate with an alternative view to the standard Weltmachtflotte argument, arguing that Admiral Raeder was correct to advocate a balanced fleet and not to concentrate solely on U-boats, as Admiral Donitz wished, or on a fleet optimized for cruiser warfare.
Admiral Raeder, when he became the navy service chief, would be compelled to adopt a flexible approach to the development and employment of naval power.
The Loss of the Bismarck contends that Admiral Raeder was a man totally wedded to the idea of major surface combatants operating as "raiders," attacking an enemy's ocean commerce.
From that point, Rhys-Jones depicts the operational picture available to the respective commanders, from Britain's Commander in Chief Home Fleet, Admiral John Tovey, and Admiral Raeder down their chains of command to the commanders at the scene.