Alexius von Meinong

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Meinong, Alexius von

 

Born July 17, 1853, in Lemberg, present-day L’vov; died Nov. 27, 1920, in Graz, Austria. Austrian idealist philosopher and psychologist.

In 1882, Meinong became a professor at the University of Graz, where in 1894 he founded the first laboratory for experimental psychology in Austria. Meinong’s philosophy is a variation of neorealism. Taking as his starting point the philosophy of D. Hume and of his teacher F. Brentano, Meinong developed the idealist theory of objects, which conceives of an object not as a material entity but as an emotional presentation. Moreover, in his view the nature of the object is irrelevant: whether it is a real thing or an ideal relation, for example, the concepts of similarity and difference. An item becomes an object only in the act of cognition. This thesis of Meinong’s was later expanded in the theory of intentionality of the German philosopher E. Husserl. But in contrast to Husserl’s phenomenology, Meinong recognized objects as having logical primacy over acts of consciousness. Meinong also developed a general theory of values. His ideas influenced the development of neopositivism, especially the early work of B. Russell.

WORKS

Untersuchungen zur Gegenstandstheorie und Psychologie. Leipzig, 1904.
Über die Stellung der Gegenstandstheorie im System der Wissenschaften. Leipzig, 1907.
Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Leipzig, 1915.
Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie. Graz, 1923.
Über Annahmen. 3rd ed. Leipzig, 1928.
Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1. Graz, 1969.

REFERENCES

Tegen, E. A. von Meinong. Lund, 1935.
Meinong Gedenkschrift. Graz, 1952.

A. G. MYSLIVCHENKO

References in periodicals archive ?
Thereafter, among continental philosophers, phenomenology and in general descriptive psychology emerges, all influenced by these earlier critical standpoints with respect to metaphysics and through the efforts of such thinkers as Franz Brentano, Edmund Husserl and Alexius Meinong.
Canada) examines the philosophies of Alexius Meinong (1853-1920) and Bertrand Russell (1872-1970) regarding the issue of whether it is possible to speak of nonexistent objects, "such as the round square, the golden mountain, and Sherlock Holmes," and connected sub-issues, such as what can have properties and how claims are true.
Influenced by anthropologist Franz Boas, sociologist Georg Simmel, American pragmatists John Dewey and William James, the value philosophies of Alexius Meinong and Josiah Royce, and W.
In course of the development of Bolzano's views, they are contrasted with the better known theory of his compatriot Alexius Meinong, and it is shown that they have a modern counterpart in the accounts of merely possible objects that were developed by Bernard Linsky and Ed Zalta, and by Timothy Williamson.
Alexius Meinong maintains that there is an entity corresponding to every possible judgment.
According to Alexius Meinong and neo-Meinongians, the domain of objects outstrips the domain of existing objects.