Atomic Diplomacy

Atomic Diplomacy

 

a term characterizing the foreign policy of the USA after the end of World War II. It was motivated by the desire of the American ruling circles to use the US nuclear weapons arsenal to blackmail and pressure other countries. Atomic diplomacy was based at first on the monopolistic possession of atomic weapons by the USA and later on retention of American superiority in the production of atomic weapons and on the invulnerability of the territory of the USA. In the implementation of atomic diplomacy, the USA rejected all proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries for the prohibition of the use, the cessation of the production, and the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The development in the USSR of atomic weapons in 1949 and hydrogen weapons in 1953, and later of intercontinental rocket missiles, doomed atomic diplomacy to failure.

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Eventually historians challenged that argument, and the debate heated up especially after the appearance of Gar Alperovitz's revisionist Atomic Diplomacy in 1965.
Even though Eisenhower shaved military costs after the Korean War, his administration intensified the 'Cold War in other ways, including through atomic diplomacy, subversion, and propaganda.
Here Kazuo Yagami, supporting and expanding upon Gar Alperovitz's interpretation in Atomic Diplomacy (1965), examines the various arguments regarding the U.
He disagrees, however, with Alperovitz's and Holloway's assertion that atomic diplomacy was a primary cause for the use of the A-bomb.
Alperovitz is the author of critically acclaimed books on the atomic bomb and atomic diplomacy and was named a distinguished finalist for the Lionel Gelber Prize for "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" (Knopf, 1995).
After studying the attacks for decades, historian Gar Alperovitz has written two books about them, Atomic Diplomacy in 1985 and The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb in 1996.
4] Ram, as well as Bidwai and Vanaik, underscores the illusion of security, indeed the intensification of insecurity, in the vise of atomic diplomacy.
Truman assumedly believed that unleashing nuclear terror would lead to the quick surrender of the Japanese (potentially saving American lives), inaugurate a policy of coercive atomic diplomacy over the Soviet Union and justify the enormous costs sunk into the project.
As David Holloway (author of Stalin and the Bomb) has noted, Stalin "had concluded after Hiroshima that atomic diplomacy rather than war was the immediate danger"; consequently, the appropriate Soviet response was to "appear tough and unyielding.
The subjects with which the collection deals include "Domestic Factors in Stalinist Atomic Diplomacy," the dynamic underlying the German policy of the Soviets between 1953 and 1964, the roots of Khrushchev's policy toward France, and the "Domestic Side of Detente" during the Nixon/Kissinger years.
The most egregious example of this attitude is to be found in Victor Mal'kov's view of Stalinist atomic diplomacy.
The official story is thoroughly disingenuous, as Gar Alperovitz shows in the updated edition of Atomic Diplomacy, originally published in 1965.