Emotivism

emotivism

In metaethics (see ethics), the view that moral judgments do not function as statements of fact but rather as expressions of the speaker's or writer's feelings. According to the emotivist, when we say “You acted wrongly in stealing that money,” we are not expressing any fact beyond that stated by “You stole that money.” It is, however, as if we had stated this fact with a special tone of abhorrence, for in saying that something is wrong, we are expressing our feelings of disapproval toward it. Emotivism was expounded by A. J. Ayer in Language, Truth and Logic (1936) and developed by Charles Stevenson in Ethics and Language (1945).

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Emotivism 

an ethical theory based on the ideas and methodology of logical positivism. According to the theory, moral judgments and terms are neither true nor false; they are devoid of cognitive content, since they cannot be verified by experience. They are significant only to the extent that they express moral emotions (for example, the emotions of the speaker).

Viewing moral concepts as arbitrary, emotivism presents a nihilistic interpretation of morality. It gained currency between the 1920’s and 1940’s in Great Britain, Austria, and the USA. Its chief spokesmen have been A. Ayer, B. Russell, R. Carnap and H. Reichenbach.

REFERENCE

Drobnitskii, O. G., and T. A. Kuz’mina. Kritika sovremennykh burzhuaznykh eticheskikh kontseptsii. Moscow, 1967. Chapter 4.