Fictionalism


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Fictionalism

 

a subjective idealist philosophical concept that regards human cognition as a system of fictions that are justified in practice but that have no theoretical significance. The concept was given its most complete expression by H. Vaihinger. F. Nietzsche’s view of truth as a useful lie and the pragmatic theory of cognition are close to fictionalism. Fictionalism absolutizes the concepts and methods of thinking used in cognition that have no direct analogues in reality, for example the construction of ideal objects, working hypotheses, and several forms of modeling, and on this basis repudiates the theory of reflection. Fictionalism is a logical conclusion to the positivism of the 19th century; it has had a definite impact on present-day types of positivism.

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References in periodicals archive ?
Fictionalism, as Vaihinger's systematic theory is often derisorily labelled, is accorded little credence in modern philosophical circles.
4) One exponent of fictionalism is Bas van Fraassen, The Empirical Stance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), and Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).
Following the discussion of fictionalism in Chapter Four, Chapter Five introduces the recent 'explanatory turn' in the debate over mathematical realism.
Fictionalism has long presented an attractive alternative to both heavy-duty realist and simple eliminativist views about entities such as properties, propositions, numbers, and possible worlds.
Chapter Thirteen targets non-standard versions of mathematical fictionalism.
The Phenomenological Objection to Fictionalism, STUART BROCK
the idea that, if error theory is true, we are better advised to go on as if (almost) nothing happened, rather than adopt some form of fictionalism about morality.
From Mathematical Fictionalism to Truth-Theoretic Fictionalism,
Since fictionalism is such a prominent option in ontology, especially in the philosophy of mathematics (thanks to Hartry Field), it is astonishing that it gets no mention in this book, and that the book's unargued 'centerpiece' apparently flatly contradicts it.
The two most credible policy recommendations that might follow from moral error theory, abolitionism and prescriptive fictionalism, are not very credible.
For it is also logically consistent with moral fictionalism, whose most common version maintains that, because morality is useful in certain respects, we should continue to make moral utterances and have moral thoughts, while at the same time refraining from asserting such utterances and believing such thoughts.