Frege


Also found in: Dictionary, Wikipedia.

Frege

Gottlob. 1848--1925, German logician and philosopher, who laid the foundations of modern formal logic and semantics in his Begriffsschrift (1879)
References in periodicals archive ?
Pero la perspectiva desde la que Frege aborda el analisis del pensamiento en cuanto sentido de las expresiones enunciativas, es radicalmente distinta de la adoptada para el analisis del sentido de los restantes tipos de nombres.
Si Frege sostiene la tesis (ii), escribe Fernandez Moreno, su postura parece ser insostenible, pues casi ninguna descripcion asociada a un nombre es satisfecha en cualquier situacion contrafactica (p.
So far forth, his view seems to combine elements of Meinong, Frege, and Russell without quite agreeing with any of them.
Frege, it is fair to say, hated the newfangled "science" of psychology and jealously guarded his advances in logic from it.
Resumen: Para aclarar que tipo de conocimiento requiere el lenguaje, se examina el conflicto aparente entre dos aportaciones fregeanas: la prioridad de la funcion comunicativa del lenguaje y una teoria del significado que parece comprometida con el psicologismo que Frege rechaza.
McGinn discusses works by Frege, Kripke, Russell, Donnellan, Kaplan, Evans, Putnam, Tarski, Davidson, and Grice.
natural language, when it is applied to the case of Gottlob Frege, who
In this paper I argue that their solution of Frege's Identity Puzzle (Frege 1892) is implausible, because Originalism fails to explain the difference in cognitive significance which Frege took to be the puzzling explanandum.
Abstract: Gottlob Frege held that concept-words refer only to concepts not to objects, and that singular terms refer only to objects not to concepts.
Frege tried to address this problem arguing that in order to know meaning of a word we have to understand it in the context of the sentence in which the word has been used.
Sin embargo, desde finales del siglo XIX y comienzos del XX y sobre todo, gracias a los trabajos de Frege (1), las cuestiones puramente metafisicas y epistemologicas se han visto desplazadas hacia cuestiones relativas al analisis logico-semantico.
In the first chapter, entitled "Prefatory Note to the Frege-Wittgenstein Correspondence", Juliet Floyd offers a historical contextualization of the correspondence from Frege to Wittgenstein, discovered in 1988, with reference to the philological work of Heinrich Scholz, a professor who began to catalogue Frege's writings in the mid-1930s.