they [Anderson and Dennison] decided that they should go after the Soviet vessels Kimovsk and Gagarin, effecting contact at about the same time on the 24th.
According to CIA, the latest "known position" for Kimovsk was roughly three hundred nautical miles (nm) east of the planned quarantine line, as of 3 AM Washington time.
In addition to those known positions, however, a DF position had been obtained on Kimovsk at 4:23 PM Washington time showing it still about three hundred miles from the quarantine line, or just about where it had been sixteen hours earlier): Clearly the ship had slowed or stopped for most of the day.
33) On the basis of the NSA account, it would appear that during the night of 23-24 October, aside from Kimovsk, NSG reported DF positions on additional ships that showed them near their previous known positions.
The rationale for waiting for visual confirmation would likely have been that it was already known that Kimovsk would not be arriving at the quarantine line on time and that Poltava had stopped and would not be arriving on the 24th at all.
Thus the secretary would have certainly been told now what he could have learned at 9 PM--that Kimovsk had slowed or stopped during the day but that lack of information on the ship's course and speed made any estimate of its arrival at the quarantine line on the 24th inconclusive, though arrival on that day could not be ruled out; that Poltava had also stopped and could not arrive until the 26th; and that no position was available for Gagarin.
Given the anxiety that all must have felt as the time for implementation of the quarantine approached, the unexpectedly inconclusive position of Kimovsk and the lack of a sighting report from the quarantine force must have elicited some comment from the briefer, question from the secretary, or perhaps a remark by Vice Admiral Charles D.
At 0930, when it was expected to be nearing the quarantine line, Kimovsk was already more than seven hundred miles northeast of the line, heading northeastward at sixteen knots.
Moreover, although sporadic, partisan resistance continued in the Carpathian mountains of Romania until the early 1960s, no major unrest had erupted earlier in Romania after World War II, particularly one forcing the communist leadership to implement reforms, unlike in East Germany and Czechoslovakia in 1953, in Poland in 1956, in the Russian Soviet Republic (Noril'sk and Vorkuta in 1953, Novoshakhtinsk and Kimovsk
in 1955), in the Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan (Kengir in 1954, Ekibastuz in 1955), and Tbilisi, Georgia in March 1956.