Ryle, Gilbert, 1900–1976, British philosopher. A graduate of Oxford, he became a tutor at Christ Church, Oxford, and later was Waynflete professor of metaphysical philosophy (1945–68) there. From 1947 to 1971 he was editor of the philosophical journal Mind. Like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Ryle was concerned with problems caused by the confusion of grammatical with logical distinctions. He pointed out the so-called category mistake, in which, usually because of a grammatical equivalence, two things are mistakenly treated as belonging to equivalent logical categories. In his Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle argued that the mind is not a non-physical substance residing in the body, "a ghost in a machine," but a set of capacities and abilities belonging to the body. All references to the mental must be understood, at least theoretically, in terms of witnessable activities. His other works include Dilemmas (1954), Plato's Progress (1966), and Collected Papers (2 vol., 1971).

Bibliography

See G. Pitcher and O. Wood, ed., Ryle (1971).

Ryle, Gilbert

(born Aug. 19, 1900, Brighton, Sussex, Eng.—died Oct. 6, 1976, Whitby, North Yorkshire) British philosopher, leading figure in the “ordinary language,” or “Oxford” school of analytic philosophy. He became a lecturer in philosophy at Christ Church College in 1924. He was Waynflete professor of metaphysical philosophy at Oxford from 1945 to 1968 and editor of Mind from 1948 to 1971. His major work, The Concept of Mind (1949), rejects Cartesian dualism as the logically incoherent doctrine of the “ghost in the machine” and argues for a “logical behaviourism” according to which attributions of mental states need refer only to the behaviour of bodies and not to any mysterious entity hidden inside them. His other works include Philosophical Arguments (1945), Dilemmas (1954), A Rational Animal (1962), Plato's Progress (1966), and The Thinking of Thoughts (1968).