added for good measure: "The race war, once it has broken out, can only be ended by the extermination/annihilation or complete subjugation of one of the parties.
was convinced that a frontal assault could achieve only limited success because the enemy could just fall back and survive to fight another day.
Plan ignored the Treaty of London - in fact, Kaiser Wilhelm dismissed it as "no more than a piece of paper" that Britain wouldn't go to war over.
Plan, however, envisaged an attack on France through Belgium.
During his tenure as the chief of the Great General Staff (1891-1906), Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen
(1833-1913) extensively used staff rides and war games to educate higher commanders and their staffs and rehearse his war plans.
The worst malefactor in turning the conflict into a worldwide conflagration was probably the British foreign secretary, Sir Edward Grey, who did want war (as did Churchill) and led Germany on, suggesting Britain would stay out until the momentum of the Schlieffen
plan became irreversible.
So with time to plan and recent experience on their side, why did French military planners not foresee the tactical inevitability of Germany's Schlieffen
Plan in 1914?
The German invasion plan, known as the Schlieffen
Plan, depended on the speed of the invasion, yet the horses employed in reconnaissance and pulling the heavy artillery were so poorly fed that they could not keep up the pace.
of Wurzburg, Germany) as Inventing the Schlieffen
Plan (2002 Oxford University Press), which argues that there never was such a plan.
In the last issue, part 1 told of the lead-up to the Great War, the preparations (or lack thereof) of the British in the face of the Schlieffen
Plan, and the beginning of the Royal Flying Corps in those hot days of 1914.
Plan had left the German Army slightly more prepared than either the French or British in regards to stores of grenades since one of the key obstacles to the success of the wide fight hook was the reduction of the dauntless, state-of-the-art Belgian fortresses at Liege.
In an insightful discussion, he makes direct connections between German brutalities in Africa (against the Hereros, for example) and aggressive, social Darwinist modes of thought that produced the Schlieffen
Plan and other indications of the increasing European propensity to resort to violence.