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1. Law the resolve or design with which a person does or refrains from doing an act, a necessary ingredient of certain offences
2. Med a natural healing process, as by first intention, in which the edges of a wound cling together with no tissue between, or by second intention, in which the wound edges adhere with granulation tissue



a purpose or goal; the direction or directedness of consciousness, will, and, to a certain extent, feelings toward an object. The concept of intention dates back to Scholasticism, which distinguished “primary intention,” oriented toward a particular, from “secondary intention,” oriented toward a universal.

In the 19th century the concept of intention was again introduced into philosophy by the German philosopher F. Brentano. In his view, intentionality signifies the “objectness” of any act of consciousness, that is, its necessary relatedness to a certain—real or imaginary—object. Ideas of intention and intentionality are central (as universal characteristics of consciousness) to the views of A. Meinong (Austria) and E. Husserl (Germany). These concepts, particularly through the work of Meinong, were adopted by psychology, resulting in a refinement of ideas of the nature and direction of psychic activity, as well as in the formation of the concept of set.



A term used by ATC (air traffic control) to ask a pilot, “What do you plan to do?”
References in periodicals archive ?
The need to account for the distinction between metaphysics (the science that deals with first intentions such as being and the ontological categories) and logic (considered to deal with, if not always to have as its subject, second intentions) caused medieval interpreters to outline various theories of second intentions and amply justifies Pini's own protracted discussion of theories of second intentions (chapters 2 and 3).
The difference between first and second intention was generally misunderstood by epistemologists of the early modem period.
But, says the reader as empiricist, would Chaucer have needed to know the medieval theory of first and second intentions, as Myles claims he did ('given the Oxford company Chaucer kept'), in order to make such connections?
While these texts are devoted primarily to matters pertaining to second intentions, they do provide important context concerning the nature mind-dependent being and its relation to mind-independent being.

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