truth value

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truth value

[′trüth ‚val·yü]
(mathematics)
The result of a logical proposition; either “true” or “false” in classical logic.
References in periodicals archive ?
Many, perhaps all, of the phenomena that a semantic theory should illuminate are definable in terms of the truth values of sentences under various conditions.
Intuitively, however, x does not go beyond [similar to] x, because the truth values of these statements constrain each other.
Neither does the truth value of a compound sentence contain the truth values of the atomic sentences as its parts.
SUMMARY: Contra Ezcurdia, it is argued that my thesis --that substitution of coreferential names or indexicals in attitude ascriptions preserves truth values of propositions semantically expressed, although it often changes truth values of propositions asserted-- is compatible with the fact that belief ascriptions play important explanatory roles.
Future contingent propositions are determinately true when actualized, not timelessly, and God's knowledge of their truth values is knowledge of when the truth value of a proposition is actually determined.
The basic concept of the calculus is, of course, the situation, which we can think of as a state of affairs, that is, a complete specification of the truth values of all propositions (in a suitable logical language), although that's closer to McCarthy's and Hayes's traditional formulation than the analysis Reiter settles on (which I describe later).
Reck distinguishes between "metaphysical platonism," which is the view that the meaning of statements of arithmetic and their objective truth values are explained by there being a model of arithmetic "out there," existing independently of us, and "contextual platonism," which reverses the order of explanation and takes logical analysis and the laws of logic as its starting point.
An infinite sequence of sentences of the form "None of these subsequent sentences are true" generates the same instability in assigning truth values.
I believe that if my arguments developed in response to Beebee's criticisms about the truth values of (1) and (2) are accepted, the interest in saving Lewis by means of Abeledo's formal resources totally disappears.
If distinct possible worlds must be different from the very beginning, then what reason do we have to believe that there are counterpart individuals whose lives help us determine the truth values of counterfactuals about the actual David and Saul?
But the account I propose does not buy the objectivity it claims at the price of postulating an inaccessible reality which determines the truth values of modal statements.
For instance, he takes a first-level predicative concept as a mode of presentation of a property rather than as a function from objects to truth values (p.