in civil law, the performance by one person (the representative) in the name and interests of another person (the principal) and on the basis of definite authorizations, of transactions or other legally significant actions that directly create, change, or terminate the civil rights and duties of the principal. Representation is necessary in cases where a person, for any number of reasons, including lack of time and inadequate qualifications, is unable to exercise his civil (primarily property) rights and duties on his own.
In Soviet law either legally competent (sui juris) citizens or legal persons may be representatives. Legal actions that can only be performed in person, for example, the signing of a will or registration of a marriage, cannot be done through a representative. Representation arises through a power of attorney based on law (for example, representation by parents of minor children in the capacity of legal representatives) or through an administrative act (for example, a guardian represents a ward on the basis of the decision of the executive committee of the appropriate soviet of people’s deputies in the establishment of wardship).
(predstavlenie), an image re-created in the brain from traces left by objects and phenomena that have produced an effect on the human sense organs but that are no longer physically present; also, an image created by the efforts of productive imagination; a higher form of sensory reflection, manifested as imagery and as visualized knowledge. In contrast to perception, a representation transcends the immediate, given quality of specific objects and relates them to a common principle or notion. A representation is realized in two forms: recollection and imagination. Perception pertains only to the present, whereas representation pertains simultaneously to the present and to the past.
Representation is reminiscent contemplation, the specific characteristic of which is its intermediate position between contemplative and thinking consciousness. Without recollection, recognition would be impossible. Hegel wrote: “What is called recollection, in the proper sense of the word, is the relating of an image to contemplation, and in the capacity, moreover, of a reduction of the direct, singular contemplation to that which is general in form—to a representation having the same content” (Soch., vol. 3, Moscow, 1956, p. 257).
The imagination contributes to the creation of representations and mental situations that cannot be directly perceived, as a whole, in reality. The more adequate the reflection in a representation, the more productive is its regulative and stimulating role in all forms of human creativity.
Perception and representation are not independent powers or capabilities of consciousness. They form an indissoluble whole, in which representation is the synthesis of many sensory impressions. Describing the dialectic of the relationship between representation and thought, V. I. Lenin wrote: “Is sensuous representation closer to reality than thought? Both yes and no. Sensuous representation cannot apprehend movement as a whole, it cannot, for example, apprehend movement with a speed of 300,000 km per second, but thought does and must apprehend it” (Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 29, p. 209).
A. G. SPIRKIN