Intuition has been defined as “a non-thought which bypasses the process of thinking and brings through a whole body sensation of ‘this information is important;’ information that one did not know before through education of past experiences, did not logically think out or reason with.” It is an inner knowing and usually happens spontaneously. It can be linked with clairsentience, the mediumistic ability to sense information. With clairsentience, the information sensed is from spirit, while with intuition it is not necessarily so. psychic ability which does not connect with spirit can be largely due to intuition.
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the ability to apprehend the truth through direct perception of it, without the confirmation provided by proof.
In the history of philosophy the concept of intuition has had different meanings. At one time it was understood as a form of immediate intellectual knowledge or contemplation (intellectual intuition). Thus, Plato asserted that the contemplation of ideas (prototypes of things in the sensual world) is a type of immediate knowledge that comes like a sudden illumination, after lengthy preparation of the mind. Throughout the history of philosophy, the concept of sensual forms of cognition was often juxtaposed to thought. Descartes, for example, asserted: “By intuition I do not mean belief in the uncertain testimony of the senses or the deceptive judgment of the disordered imagination, but the conception of a clear and attentive mind so simple and distinct that we feel no doubt about what we are thinking. Or, what is the same thing, the firm conception of a clear and attentive mind, engendered only by the natural light of reason and which, thanks to its simplicity, is more reliable than deduction itself” (Izbr. proizv., Moscow, 1950, p. 86).
In his system Hegel dialectically combined direct and indirect knowledge. Intuition has also been treated as cognition in the form of sensual contemplation (sensual intution): “only the sensual … is unquestionably certain, as clear as the sun,” and therefore the secret of intuitive cognition “is concentrated in the sensual” (L. Feuerbach, Izbr. filosofskie proizvedeniia, vol. 1, Moscow, 1955, p. 187).
Intuition has also been understood as instinct that directly determines the behavior of the organism, without preliminary learning (H. Bergson). It has also been interpreted as the hidden, unconscious prime principle of the creative process (Freud).
Several trends in bourgeois philosophy treat intuition as divine revelation—a wholly unconscious process that is incompatible with logic or practical experience (intuitivism). The various interpretations of intuition have in common an emphasis on the principle of spontaneity in the process of cognition, as distinguished from the indirect, discursive character of logical thought.
Materialist dialectics sees the rational core of the concept of intuition in the principle of the spontaneity of cognition, which represents the unity of the sensual and the rational. Scientific cognition, as well as various forms of artistic assimilation of the world, does not always occur in an explicit, logically and factually supported form. In many instances, a man suddenly grasps a complex situation—for example, during a military battle or in making a diagnosis or determining the guilt or innocence of a defendant. The role of intuition is particularly great when one must go beyond the limits of existing means of cognition to penetrate the unknown.
Intuition, however, is not irrational or superrational. In the process of intuitive cognition, all the signs that lead to a conclusion, as well as the method by which it is arrived at, are not consciously perceived. Intuition is not a special path to cognition that transcends sensations, ideas, and thinking. Rather, it represents a special type of thought whose separate links run more or less imperceptibly through the consciousness, making it possible to perceive truth—the result of thought—with utmost clarity. Intuition can be sufficient for the perception of the truth, but for convincing others and oneself of this truth, it is insufficient. For that, proof is necessary.
A. G. SPIRKIN