bivalent

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bivalent

[bī′vā·lənt]
(chemistry)
Possessing a valence of two.
References in periodicals archive ?
It derives from the fact that the probabilist is assuming bivalence with an excluded middle, so that one is tall or not, while the fuzzy logician is speaking of a world where one can be more or less tall.
On page 170 he characterizes the reply: "it is simply that Heidegger does not give up bivalence in characterizing disclosedness as the original truth.
Nevertheless, Aristotle rejects bivalence for future particular statements.
Either conception is an epistemic or anti-realist conception of truth that leads to a rejection of the principle of bivalence.
For these "realism theses" (R1 Independence from the Mental, R2 Correspondence, R3 Uniqueness of Truth, R4 Bivalence, R5 Passivity of Knower, R6 Realism of the Subject), he relies on mostly analytic sources, especially Putnam and Dummett, but also includes what others, including Frege, Russell, and Wittgenstein, have contributed on the subject of realism.
Dummett points out that this view avoids the absurd consequence that no undecidable proposition is intelligible, but leads to rejection of the principle of bivalence and of the law of excluded middle and calls for a detailed explanation of what is meant by saying that a proposition can be justified.
I argue that, in fact, presentists must choose between bivalence and libertarianism: if presentism is true, then either the future is open or no one is free in the way that libertarians understand freedom.
There are useful discussions of where Aristotle abandons bivalence and why.
The realist holds the idea of truth as subject to the principle of bivalence, that is, that reality renders statements either true or false independently of whether anyone can make that determination.
Sections XVII-XX concern the implications for the principle of bivalence, the law of excluded middle, and the principle of noncontradiction.
Timothy Williamson, in various places, has put forward an argument that is supposed to show that denying bivalence is absurd.
Thus it is argued (1) that quantum phenomena, such as the wave/particle dualism or the collapse of the wavepacket, cannot be assigned a determinate value apart from our acts of observation/measurement; (2) that this entails the impossibility of positing a real-world quantum domain beyond such effects of observer interference or outcomes contingent on the kind of experiment one chooses to conduct; and moreover (3) that it may also mean suspending certain axioms of classical logic (such as bivalence or excluded middle, if not the law of noncontradiction) since these cannot apply to undecidable instances like those mentioned in item (1) above.