expected utility

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expected utility

[ek′spek·təd yü′til·əd·ē]
(mathematics)
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Calculate the expected utilities for each design alternative based on the sampled values for the failure probabilities and respective failure counts.
influences) another agent in the joint network of the CSG the expected utilities of actions (a) are normalized (Eq.
B] of the mortality-linked security by maximizing their end-of-period expected utilities, respectively.
As each of the depositors has probability 1/2 of being the first to receive the signals and make a decision, a depositor's ex ante expected utility is the equally weighted expected utilities of depositors 1 and 2 at the beginning of period 1.
Choice situations presented to Agents, unlike whole legal institutions, can be thought of as occurring at particular times; it is the affected persons subjective probabilities at the time of the Agent's choice that, I suggest, might be used to calculate the expected utilities that are determinative of ex ante efficiency.
In defense of my claim, let me note that it is perfectly standard in decision theory to take a set of pure strategies as given, with their various corresponding pay-offs tabulated in a decision matrix; all the mixed strategies then come for free, as it were, their expected utilities thereby determined.
The unemployed choose the intensity of their search efforts so as to maximize the discounted sum of their expected utilities.
Given the expected utilities and variances, it becomes possible to define an "efficient" set of assortments (Markowitz 1959).
In DRIPS, ranges of utility values are computed for partial plans, encompassing the best and worst expected utilities of all possible completions of the partial plan (Haddawy and Suwandi 1994).
The stochastic dominance procedure is based on the theory of expected utility and involves a pair-wise comparison of expected utilities derived by decision makers from a set of risky net revenues (King and Robison 1984).
Thus, if we compare P's expected utilities in the agent-veto and unitary equilibria, we can gain insight into P's incentive to choose one regime over the other.
Accordingly, in the next section we consider the case in which individuals are expected utility maximizers and the social welfare function can be characterized by just two parameters, one reflecting aversion (or proneness) to inequality in the intergenerational distribution of expected utility and the other reflecting whether, and to what extent, there is pure discounting of future expected utilities, per se.