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the philosophical doctrine and methodological position that reject either the objectivity of causal relations (ontological indeterminism) or the cognitive value of causal explanations in science (methodological indeterminism).

In the history of philosophy, from ancient Greek philosophy (Socrates) to the present day, indeterminism and determinism have been advanced as opposing conceptions relating to the problem of human will and freedom of choice, the problem of man’s responsibility for his actions. Indeterminism treats the will as an autonomous force and contends that the principles of causality are not applicable in explaining human choice and behavior. Indeterminists accuse determinists of fatalism. Marxism bases itself on the view that “far from assuming fatalism, determinism in fact provides a basis for reasonable action” (V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 440) and that determinism “in no way destroys man’s reason, or conscience, or appraisal … of his actions” (ibid., p. 159).

In contemporary bourgeois philosophy various forms of indeterminism have become quite widespread. Thus, the Baden school of neo-Kantianism limited the principle of determinism to the realm of the natural sciences and denied that it was applicable to “sciences of the spirit” (W. Windelband and H. Rickert). Neopositivism, pragmatism, and personalism tried to limit determinism to the realm of logic.

The problem of indeterminism versus determinism became particularly relevant with the growth of modern quantum physics. It was found that the principles of classical determinism were not suitable for describing the processes at work in the subatomic world. In this connection attempts were made to interpret the basic laws of quantum theory in an indeterminist or agnostic sense. In this effort, one of the historical forms of determinism, namely, mechanistic determinism, was equated with determinism in general. The difficulties involved in clarifying the problems of causality in modern physics resulted in the strengthening of tendencies toward indeterminism in modern bourgeois philosophy. Thus B. Russell, H. Reichenbach, and P. Frank contended that determinism in general had no scientific value and that the axiom of causality had no place even in classical physics: the assertion of causality could not be applied to the relation between observable facts, since the results of measurement were of the nature of the probability distribution. Such ideas as that of the “free will” of the electron and that individual microphenomena are guided by teleological forces were other expressions of indeterminism.

Dialectical materialism, while rejecting indeterminism, at the same time points out the insufficiency of earlier mechanistic concepts of determinism and presents a new generalized concept of determinism based on the achievements of modern natural and social science.


References in periodicals archive ?
Soft indeterminists" are indeterminists who reject the argument that indeterminism is "hard" (incompatible with free will) on the ground that randomness that undermines agency.
We do not, for example, have to become radical indeterminists like Richard von Mises if we choose to adopt a subjective definition for probability.
must always maintain towards his subject an indeterminist point of view.
Psychoanalytic Ass'n 933, 965 (1986) (suggesting that the law be re-evaluated to "reconsider whether society and the individual are in fact best served by concepts of moral and judicial evaluation that carry the indeterminist connotations of praise and blame").
Indeterminist archaeologists denied the possibility of reconstructing, without help of ethnography, the ancient meaning of assemblages and the functions of artefacts.
The Indeterminist Intuition: Source and Status, SHAUN NICHOLS
But Horst doesn't take quantum mechanics to be a good reason to be an indeterminist (102).
Although early-period scholars sought to identify a middle-path between "rigid" hard determinist and "chaotic" indeterminist libertarian extremes, but failed to clearly articulate their positions, Siderits's paleo-compatibilism seeks to salvage elements of both extremes by locating them on different levels of discourse one of which, the conventional (in which persons exist and have free will), reduces to the other, the ultimate (in which there are no persons but only person-series that are entirely determined by impersonal causes).
Russell's idea founded in quantum thinking that "God performs special, intentional, but non-interventionist acts at the indeterminist quantum level" (p.
7) For a comprehensive study of rereading and the problems it poses for both indeterminist and for linear, "first time" readings, see Calinescu.
Although Unger is not a radical indeterminist, he does believe that expressions of rights and principles underdetermine the institutions that would ensure their effective enjoyment (pp.
Although early-period scholars sought a middle path between "rigid" hard determinist and "chaotic" indeterminist libertarian extremes, but failed to clearly articulate their positions, middle-period scholars Siderits and Goodman shift in the direction of partial incompatibilism or semicompatibilism, in Siderits's case, or full incompatibilism, in Goodman's.