Subjectivism

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Subjectivism

 

a world view that ignores the objective approach to reality and denies the existence of objective laws of nature and society. Subjectivism is one of the main epistemological sources of idealism. In essence, it grants primacy to the role played by the subject in various spheres of activity and in the cognitive process above all. The concomitant abstraction of thought, which does not correspond to the nature of objects, leads ultimately to a divorce from reality, subjective blindness, agnosticism, and relativism (see V. I. Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 29, p. 322).

Subjectivism has been expounded by such philosophers as G. Berkeley, D. Hume, and J. G. Fichte; the philosophy of I. Kant is also marked by subjectivist concepts. In the bourgeois philosophy of the 19th and 20th centuries, subjectivism has been a basic principle of such idealist schools of thought as neo-Kan-tianism, empiriocriticism, philosophy of life, pragmatism, neopositivism, and existentialism.

According to Marxist philosophy, which rejects subjectivism, the subject’s active role in practical life and in the cognitive process presupposes the existence of a dialectical relationship between subject and object as well as the existence of an objective reality that has its own laws and is independent of consciousness. Various distortions of Marxism-Leninism have their foundations in subjectivism. Right-wing revisionism, proceeding from a subjectivist understanding of practice, eclectically attempts to combine the principles of Marxist philosophy with subjectivist philosophical conceptions, such as existentialism and pragmatism. The left-wing revision of Marxism-Leninism is an attempt to replace its creative theory with a system of subjectively interpreted dogmas that serve as a justification for voluntarism.

In the political sphere, subjectivism is reflected in policy decisions based on arbitrary, unscientific principles, a contemptuous attitude toward the laws of society, and a belief in the omnipotence of administrative decisions. Genuinely scientific policymaking combines a strictly objective approach to reality with recognition of activism and initiative displayed by the masses, by social classes, and by individuals. This approach is a guarantee against subjectivism in any form.

References in periodicals archive ?
Like most physicists, he was trapped in the contradiction between his natural objectivism and the subjectivistic physics that he was taught.
The model belongs to the subjectivistic theoretical approach because it stresses the importance of perceptions, attitudes, and intentions (all of which are subject to social influence) over any objective match between system and task.
Thus, their revised model is both objective and subjective, both deterministic and subjectivistic.
This view started to be questioned at the beginning of the twelfth century and eventually led to the birth of the present subjectivistic concept of the individual.
Rather, it is to become aware of what would have to be done to reshape attitudes toward the study of literature (and other nonscientific subjects) so that students will not automatically be tempted to dismiss such study as so much personal and subjectivistic patter.
Henri Bergson, in Time and Free Will, further modified Kant's subjectivistic definition with his theory of duree, setting the stage for the continuing critical understanding of time in literary modernism as an irreconcilable dualism between private and public time.
Hume states this subjectivistic theory in a striking passage in the Treatise:
Naturalistic humanists believe that, although our ethical values are relative to human experience, some degree of objectivity is possible in ethics without depending on purely subjectivistic caprice.
He traces Fichte's and Schelling's treatments of the idea of recognition as efforts to overcome the solipsistic and subjectivistic tendencies in idealism (which Jacobi criticized), and he suggests that Hegel further developed the idea of recognition and community in the Phenomenology (85-86) in ways that effectively internalized and responded to Jacobi's critique.
That is, we are not presupposing a relativist or subjectivistic approach to morals (which makes principles of restraint in some ways much more plausible), in which the fact that one holds a belief, as opposed to the reasons why one holds it, is taken as the salient feature.
On the most subjectivistic notion of admissibility, the admissibility constraint would amount to this: you may set C(A|KB) equal to C(A|B) just in case you believe that K contains no information about A over and above that contained in B, regardless of the grounds of this belief.
One notion was liberal, individualistic, subjectivistic, formal; another notion was pragmatic and focused on the group, on historical context, on broad social patterns.