The features illustrated above indicated that apparently, citizens engaged in ADPE mainly act as respondents for data collection, rather than the ends to serve.
Another illustration of the weakness of citizen participation performance measurement is that ADPE fails to hold the POs prone to serious problems to public account.
The former two government bureaus have not been covered in ADPE before their officials' crackdown.
For the latter two POs, ADPE results ironically depicted them as highly performing.
A fire disaster that took place after the World Expo 2010 showed again that the ADPE might "miss the target" to control.
Supposedly, as the scale of renovation projects expanded quickly before and during the World Expo, the Shanghai ADPE should be aware that the construction bureau faces higher corruption risk, and the issue of construction safety becomes more critical.
Our interviewees responded that as the ADPE performance results were often manipulated and biased, leading CPC officials seldom used them in important decisions such as promoting the executives of departments; and even if they were used, they were counted only as "complementary reference" (20).
As seen from the ADPE experiment in Shanghai, we argued that the public accountability are in nature "bureaucracy driven", in that the public were present in evaluating public sectors, but had limited control on the design and implementation of these accountability mechanisms.