As a side note, another key scene from this movie, wherein Admiral Yamamoto
delivers the famously prophetic line, "I fear we have wakened a sleeping giant," appears to have been purely the concoction of a (very talented) Hollywood screenwriter.
On 5 November, Admiral Yamamoto issued Combined Fleet Secret Order 1, of which section 4 stipulated that the Striking Force, in accordance with instructions to be detailed by its commander, would maintain strict radio silence from the time of departure from the Inland Sea.
For example, Combined Fleet Order 11, the 3 December notification from Admiral Yamamoto to the Imperial Japanese Navy that all vessels belonging to Panama, Norway, Denmark, and Greece were to be treated as enemy, was received by the 5th Carrier Division flagship on 4 December at 1130 (11:30 AM, Tokyo time) and by the 1st Destroyer Squadron flag at 1350 (1:50 PM) on 3 December.
After Admiral Yamamoto issued his secret order dictating radio silence once the task force departed for the Kurile Islands, the Kido Butai began a period of training, replenishment, and redeployment to the final assembly point at Saeki Wan, in the Oita Prefecture, in northeast Kyushu.
In the midafternoon of 17 November, Admiral Yamamoto, aboard Nagato, arrived at Saeki Wan for one last meeting with many of the staff and officers of the Kido Butai.
So it makes do with brief, formal scenes of Nipponese officers, principally the attack's formulator and chief proponent, Admiral Yamamoto
(Mako), making subtitled pronouncements about the United States' oil embargo having given them little choice but to go to war.
Japan's Admiral Yamamoto
is shown with the task force that attacked Hawaii, announcing: "The rise and fall of our empire is at stake.
What made this air battle memorable was that Admiral Yamamoto
and a number of senior staff died when both of the "Bettys" were shot down.
4) The message noted that on April 18, Admiral Yamamoto would be flying from the Japanese-held island of Rabaul to the island of Bougainville, the closest he had ever come to the U.
23) The attackers did not know which of the bombers bore Admiral Yamamoto.
It is difficult to imagine that Admiral Yamamoto could have done much better given the numerical and qualitative advantages of the American ships and aircraft.
United States superiority in numbers of troops, materiel, production, and intelligence by April 1943 more than offset any leadership advantages Admiral Yamamoto might have enjoyed over his American adversaries or his successors.