Alfred Von Schlieffen

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The following article is from The Great Soviet Encyclopedia (1979). It might be outdated or ideologically biased.

Schlieffen, Alfred Von


Born Feb. 28, 1833, in Berlin; died there Jan. 4, 1913. German military theoretician. General field marshal (1911). Count.

Schlieffen served in the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 and the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71 as a staff officer. He served as chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1905, in which post he improved the training of General Staff officers. As a follower of H. Moltke the elder and one of the ideologists of German militarism, Schlieffen developed a theory for surrounding and wiping out an enemy by a decisive strike against one or two flanks. Schlieffen was the author of a plan for warfare on two fronts, against France and Russia.


Gesammelte Schriften, vols. 1–2. Berlin, 1913.
In Russian translation:
Kanny, 2nd ed. Moscow, 1938.
The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, 3rd Edition (1970-1979). © 2010 The Gale Group, Inc. All rights reserved.
References in periodicals archive ?
The Schlieffen Plan was devised in Germany in the last decade of the 19th century by the Chief of the Great General Staff, Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen. The plan posited a worst-case scenario of a two-front war.
alfred von Schlieffen was in charge of the entire German army.
Alfred von Schlieffen was responsible for all German Army operational planning as chief of the Prussian General Staff from 1891 through 1905.
Two essays look ahead, comparing Clausewitz to Alfred von Schlieffen in their interpretations of Frederick the Great's campaigns; and Clausewitz to Marc Bloch on their interpretations of disastrous defeats--Prussia in 1806 and France in 1940, respectively.
The war plan that Germany ultimately adopted was created by Count Alfred von Schlieffen, chief of the General Staff from 1891 to 1905.
In 1905 Count Alfred von Schlieffen, Chief of the General Staff, decided that by sending his armies through Belgium he could defeat France within weeks, leaving Russia an easy target.
Herwig discusses the various belligerents' mobilization plans and weighs in on a recent debate about the very existence of the famous "Schlieffen Plan." Without getting bogged down in terminology, he shows that most leaders in the German Army had no doubt that when war came, they would wage it using the "operational concept devised" by Count Alfred von Schlieffen in 1905 (xii).
During his tenure as the chief of the Great General Staff (1891-1906), Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen (1833-1913) extensively used staff rides and war games to educate higher commanders and their staffs and rehearse his war plans.
They never do, but could an army renowned for operational excellence have achieved the victory Alfred von Schlieffen's bold concept apparently deserved?
A German plan for the invasion of Western Europe had been prepared by Count Alfred Von Schlieffen in 1906.
Civil War; and General Alfred von Schlieffen had already written the German contingency plan for a two-front war literally decades before WWI began.
THE HISTORY OF GERMAN war planning prior to the First World War has been dominated by the so-called `Schlieffen Plan', commonly said to have been developed in a study written in early 1906 by the recently retired Chief of the German General Staff, Count Alfred von Schlieffen (1853-1913).