Atomic Diplomacy

Atomic Diplomacy

 

a term characterizing the foreign policy of the USA after the end of World War II. It was motivated by the desire of the American ruling circles to use the US nuclear weapons arsenal to blackmail and pressure other countries. Atomic diplomacy was based at first on the monopolistic possession of atomic weapons by the USA and later on retention of American superiority in the production of atomic weapons and on the invulnerability of the territory of the USA. In the implementation of atomic diplomacy, the USA rejected all proposals of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries for the prohibition of the use, the cessation of the production, and the elimination of stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The development in the USSR of atomic weapons in 1949 and hydrogen weapons in 1953, and later of intercontinental rocket missiles, doomed atomic diplomacy to failure.

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Atomic diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam: The Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation with Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster) and Gar Alperovitz and Sanho Tree.
Eventually historians challenged that argument, and the debate heated up especially after the appearance of Gar Alperovitz's revisionist Atomic Diplomacy in 1965.
(3) Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam," the Use of the Atomic Bomb and the American Confrontation With Soviet Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965).
Even though Eisenhower shaved military costs after the Korean War, his administration intensified the 'Cold War in other ways, including through atomic diplomacy, subversion, and propaganda.
Alperovitz is especially faulted for developing the theory of atomic diplomacy; that is, essentially waving "the bomb" in Stalin's face, when, in fact, the United States possessed very few.
Here Kazuo Yagami, supporting and expanding upon Gar Alperovitz's interpretation in Atomic Diplomacy (1965), examines the various arguments regarding the U.S.
Alperovitz is the author of critically acclaimed books on the atomic bomb and atomic diplomacy and was named a distinguished finalist for the Lionel Gelber Prize for "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb" (Knopf, 1995).
She does not, however, engage the substantial revisionist literature that has indicted Truman for being too precipitate and too simplistic, for quickly reversing Roosevelt's cooperation with Moscow, for attempting "atomic diplomacy" in August 1945, for exaggerating the Soviet threat when the United States enjoyed a preponderance of power, and for "redbaiting" political critics on the left like Henry Wallace.
Berstein, Brigadier General Bonnie Fellers wrote in 1945, "Neither the atomic bombing nor the entry of the Soviet Union into the war forced Japan's unconditional surrender." After studying the attacks for decades, historian Gar Alperovitz has written two books about them, Atomic Diplomacy in 1985 and The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb in 1996.
The Kargil (northern Kashmir) conflict of 1999 reveals the instability of atomic diplomacy; indeed, the consolidation of the Hindu right in India and the military coup are further illustrations of both instability across borders and authoritarianism within them (the hallmark of atomic diplomacy).
Truman assumedly believed that unleashing nuclear terror would lead to the quick surrender of the Japanese (potentially saving American lives), inaugurate a policy of coercive atomic diplomacy over the Soviet Union and justify the enormous costs sunk into the project.
In 1965, Life magazine ran a highly positive review of historian Gar Alperovitz's "Atomic Diplomacy." The book, which has been called the first serious challenge to the idea that the only reason for dropping the atomic bomb was to quickly end the war, suggested that concern about postwar relations with the Soviet Union was the key factor.