fact-value distinction


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fact-value distinction

the distinction (often associated with HUME and the Logical Positivists) between factual assertions and moral assertions as two distinct classes of assertions, and the claim that moral assertions cannot be derived logically from factual assertions. While some sociologists have accepted the terms of this distinction (including, significantly, Max WEBER), other sociologists have refused to accept such a limitation on the significance of social science on the grounds that, for all practical purposes, facts and theories both inform and influence values, and that to deny this is to suggest an ‘irrationalism’ of values which is unwarranted. As GOULDNER (1973) remarks, ‘one possible meaning of the term “objectivity” in social science is the contribution it might make to a human unity of mankind’. See also VALUE FREEDOM AND VALUE NEUTRALITY, VALUE RELEVANCE, BECKER, HIERARCHY OF CREDIBILITY.
References in periodicals archive ?
In "From Sinks to Webs: Critical Social Science after the Fact-Value Distinction," P.
As in the works written since After Virtue, MacIntyre's main concern in his new book is the fact-value distinction.
Law scholars debate the fact-value distinction in interdisciplinary studies of law.
In this new volume targeted to undergraduate students of economics, James Halteman and Edd Noell lament the fact-value distinction found in modern economics.
The discussion of these objections gives particular attention to the legacy of Hume's fact-value distinction.
In my reading, Ward employs the fact-value distinction as a surrogate for the unresolved science-religion demarcation, and he thereby ignores one of the bigger philosophical questions of the last century (i.
Haller's arguments depend, furthermore, on additional, related and similarly questionable distinctions, including a fact-value distinction which treats modem science as if it possessed moral neutrality and did not presuppose certain goods, as well as a distinction between ethics and prudence that forgets that prudence is a virtue that is always entangled with purposes.
To argue from the existence of a fact-value distinction to the obligation to take responsibility for our actions is to violate the fact-value distinction" (p.
There is, first of all, a certain muddying of the philosophical waters in suggesting that Charles Stevenson's notion that certain predicates have "emotive meaning"(6) and Philippa Foot's notion that certain predicates are "thick concepts"(7) (involving an inextricable bonding of the descriptive and evaluative)(8) show "that one need not reject the fact-value distinction nor subscribe to the central tenets of continental philosophy in order to recognize that descriptive sentences containing seemingly descriptive words arrayed in a seemingly descriptive semantic structure often mask statements and conclusions that are in important ways normative, evaluative, and prescriptive.
Cora Diamond's "`We Are Perpetually Moralists': Iris Murdoch, Fact, and Value" maintains a steady attention to the fact-value distinction so important in analytic philosophy, and especially to the publicized dispute between R.
Schmitt and Copenhaver make a plausible case that many supposedly modern philosophical issues - the embeddedness of thought in language, the need to choose among incommensurate conceptual schemes, the problem of the fact-value distinction - have roots going back to the Renaissance.
A second target is the Humean fact-value distinction, especially in its relegation of value to an inferior and purportedly subjective ontological position.