In "From Sinks to Webs: Critical Social Science after the Fact-Value Distinction
As in the works written since After Virtue, MacIntyre's main concern in his new book is the fact-value distinction
Law scholars debate the fact-value distinction
in interdisciplinary studies of law.
In this new volume targeted to undergraduate students of economics, James Halteman and Edd Noell lament the fact-value distinction
found in modern economics.
The discussion of these objections gives particular attention to the legacy of Hume's fact-value distinction
In my reading, Ward employs the fact-value distinction
as a surrogate for the unresolved science-religion demarcation, and he thereby ignores one of the bigger philosophical questions of the last century (i.
Haller's arguments depend, furthermore, on additional, related and similarly questionable distinctions, including a fact-value distinction
which treats modem science as if it possessed moral neutrality and did not presuppose certain goods, as well as a distinction between ethics and prudence that forgets that prudence is a virtue that is always entangled with purposes.
To argue from the existence of a fact-value distinction
to the obligation to take responsibility for our actions is to violate the fact-value distinction
There is, first of all, a certain muddying of the philosophical waters in suggesting that Charles Stevenson's notion that certain predicates have "emotive meaning"(6) and Philippa Foot's notion that certain predicates are "thick concepts"(7) (involving an inextricable bonding of the descriptive and evaluative)(8) show "that one need not reject the fact-value distinction
nor subscribe to the central tenets of continental philosophy in order to recognize that descriptive sentences containing seemingly descriptive words arrayed in a seemingly descriptive semantic structure often mask statements and conclusions that are in important ways normative, evaluative, and prescriptive.
Cora Diamond's "`We Are Perpetually Moralists': Iris Murdoch, Fact, and Value" maintains a steady attention to the fact-value distinction
so important in analytic philosophy, and especially to the publicized dispute between R.
Schmitt and Copenhaver make a plausible case that many supposedly modern philosophical issues - the embeddedness of thought in language, the need to choose among incommensurate conceptual schemes, the problem of the fact-value distinction
- have roots going back to the Renaissance.
A second target is the Humean fact-value distinction
, especially in its relegation of value to an inferior and purportedly subjective ontological position.