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term used to describe various types of individual freedom, such as religious liberty, political liberty, freedom of speech, right of self-defense, and others. It is also used as a general term for the sum of specific liberties.
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FreedomSee International Space Station.
the human capacity to act in accordance with aims and interests, relying on a knowledge of objective necessity.
In the history of social thought, the problem of freedom was traditionally reduced to the question of whether people have free will—in other words, whether their intentions and actions are governed by external circumstances. The materialist conception of history rejects the idealist view of individual freedom as individual consciousness independent of objective circumstances. Marxism also opposes the metaphysical belief that there is an antithesis between freedom and necessity—a view that was widely held by philosophers and natural scientists of the 17th through 19th centuries, including T. Hobbes, P. H. Holbach, J. O. de La Mettrier, P. S. de Laplace, and E. Dühring. The Marxist conception of freedom in dialectical interaction with necessity is opposed to voluntarism, which asserts the arbitrary willfulness of human actions, and to fatalism, which regards actions as predetermined. Unlike the idealists, including Hegel and the existentialists, who limit the problem of freedom to the realm of consciousness, Marxism argues that without the possibility of realization, the consciousness of freedom is merely an illusion.
In their everyday activity people encounter not an abstract necessity but its concrete, historical embodiment in existing social and economic relations that determine the range of people’s interests, as well as in the material means for achieving desired goals. People are not free to choose the objective conditions in which they function, but they do possess a certain freedom in their choice of goals, since at any given moment there are usually several real possibilities of varying feasibility. Even when there is no alternative, people are in a position to forestall undesirable developments or hasten desirable ones. In addition, they are more or less free in their choice of the means for attaining a particular end. Thus, freedom is not absolute but relative, and it is made real through the choice of a definite plan of action. The degree of freedom increases as people grow more aware of their real possibilities, as they gain greater access to the means of attaining desired goals, and as their interests coincide more with the aspirations of many other people and especially with those of entire social classes, as well as with the objective trends of social progress.
Based on these considerations, Marxists define freedom as “the known necessity.” According to this point of view, the freedom of an individual, a group, a class, or an entire society does not consist “in an imaginary independence” from objective laws but in the ability to choose and to “make decisions with knowledge of the subject” (F. Engels, Anti-Dühring, 1966, p. 112). The individual’s historically relative but practically effective freedom to choose a line of action under various circumstances makes him morally and socially responsible for his actions. Moreover, “negative freedom,” or freedom from deprivation, exploitation, and social and national oppression is a condition for “positive freedom,” which is associated with creative work, self-determination, and the comprehensive development of the individual.
Freedom does not mean arbitrary choice. Man’s freedom in thought and action does not involve freedom from causality, and freedom is not negated by the causal determination of thoughts, interests, intentions, and actions, because these human capacities are not determined in identical ways. Regardless of the origin of their aims and intentions, people enjoy freedom to the extent that they have the real possibility of exercising a choice or preference that objectively corresponds to their interests and to the extent that external circumstances do not force them to act against personal interests and needs. Abstract freedom does not exist. Freedom is always concrete and relative. Depending on the objective circumstances and the specific situation, people may enjoy freedom or be totally deprived of it. They may have freedom in some spheres of activity but not in others. Moreover, the degree of freedom may vary greatly, from freedom in the choice of goals to freedom in the choice of means or to freedom only to adapt to reality.
In reality, freedom exists in necessity in the form of an unbroken chain of past free choices that have resulted in the present condition of society. Necessity, which exists within freedom in the form of objective circumstances, can only be realized through free action. Consequently, historical determinism does not deny freedom of choice in social action but presupposes it, including it as a result of such action.
According to Marx’ definition, free conscious activity is a species characteristic distinguishing humans from animals, and the freedom enjoyed in a particular historical epoch is a necessary product of historical development. Engels wrote: “The first men who separated themselves from the animal kingdom were in all essentials as unfree as the animals themselves, but each step forward in civilization was a step toward freedom” (ibid). Despite all its contradictions and its antagonistic character, social development has generally been accompanied by an expansion of the limits of individual freedom, and ultimately it will result in the liberation of humanity from social restrictions on freedom in classless communist society, where “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 4, p. 447). If the extent of human freedom is considered a measure of social progress, the pace of social progress depends on the degree of freedom people possess.
The degree of freedom enjoyed in a specific historical epoch is generally defined by the level of development of the productive forces, the extent of people’s knowledge of the objective processes in nature and in society, and the social and political structure of the society. The freedom of the individual always represents merely a portion of the freedom enjoyed by an entire society. In this sense, as Lenin pointed out when he repudiated anarchistic, individualistic conceptions of the freedom of the individual, “one cannot live in society and be free from society” (Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 12, p. 104).
In antagonistic class society the division of labor, private ownership of the means of production, and the division of society into antagonistic classes result in the domination of particular interests and the spontaneous operation of processes that are beyond people’s control and that are accompanied by social cataclysms. Under such conditions, the reverse side of the freedom of the ruling class to dispose of property, material wealth, and knowledge is the necessity for the exploited class to labor for the enrichment of others and to obey the will of others. In the relations between individuals, the individual freedom of some is eroded by the arbitrary power of others to do as they please. The measure of individual freedom is the extent of private property, which is the main determinant of opportunities for enjoying material and cultural goods. Under these conditions, the freedom of the overwhelming majority is restricted, and at the same time, there is a colossal waste of material and human resources in a society.
Seeking to expropriate for its own use as much as possible of the total freedom potentially available to society as a whole, the ruling class in antagonistic class society has always imposed maximum regimentation on the behavior of the rest of the population by means of various social norms, such as caste systems, social estates, and other hierarchical and legal systems. Such legalized limitations on the behavior of the majority become the condition for the freedom and arbitrary rule of the privileged minority.
Regardless of its ideological form, the people’s struggle against social restrictions on their freedom has been a powerful, driving force for social progress throughout history. Demands for freedom and equality have fueled each other, although they have been justified in different ways by the ideologists of various classes. On the eve of the bourgeois revolutions in Western Europe and North America, these demands took the form of an assertion of the natural right of all people to partake equally in the benefits of civilization, to dispose equally of the fruits of their labor, and to determine their own fate. Under the slogan “Liberty, equality, and fraternity,” the progressive bourgeoisie led the masses in the struggle against feudalism. However, these principles could not be realized in capitalist society.
The history of capitalism refuted the bourgeois doctrines of freedom, especially the popular, 19th-century liberal ideas of A. Smith, J. Bentham, and J. S. Mill, who argued that maximum restrictions on government, the freedom of the individual to dispose of his private property, and the individual’s pursuit of rational self-interest would lead to universal well-being, with the result that the individual freedom of all members of society would flourish. Even in the most advanced capitalist countries, individual freedom is largely a formality, and reactionary forces constantly infringe on the rights won by the masses through stubborn struggle (for example, freedom of speech, freedom of conscience, freedom of organization, and freedom of assembly).
Because it is irresistibly attractive to the broad masses, the slogan of “freedom” is widely used by bourgeois ideologists for propaganda purposes. For precisely this reason, the phrase “the free world” is used to designate the capitalist West, and the most reactionary organizations promote their own interests by using the word “freedom” in a wide variety of contexts. Many bourgeois ideologists, including M. Friedman, H. Wallich, and C. Whittaker, openly counterpose freedom to equality. At the same time, various technocratic and behaviorist theories, which denigrate and even openly reject the freedom of the individual, have become popular in the West. For example, the American social psychologist B. F. Skinner and his followers deny individual freedom and justify the manipulation of people’s consciousness and behavior. With the crisis of bourgeois individualism, with the increasing restriction of individual freedom and disregard for human dignity by the state-monopoly bureaucracy, these theories are attractive to members of the ruling class who wish to suppress democratic rights and strengthen bureaucratic control over the masses. At the same time, these theories are shared by representatives of the liberal intelligentsia and the radical youth, who have become so disillusioned with the traditional values of bourgeois civilization that they are inclined to regard all individual freedom as a sham. From a long-term historical perspective, however, the expansion of freedom is a dialectical, irreversible process moving toward the consistent social and national emancipation of mankind.
The objective conditions for genuine freedom can be realized only through the elimination of the antagonistic relations that private property fosters between people. When planned development replaces the spontaneous processes in society, eliminating most unforeseen economic and social consequences, people’s social activity becomes genuinely free, conscious, creative historical action. According to Engels, in communist society “the objective, external forces which have hitherto dominated history will pass under the control of men themselves. It is only from this point that men, with full consciousness, will fashion their own history; it is only from this point that the social causes set in motion by men will have, predominantly and in constantly increasing measure, the effects willed by men. It is humanity’s leap from the realm of necessity into the realm of freedom” (Anti-Dühring, 1966, p. 288). At the same time, if the maximum degree of individual freedom is to be attained, the goals set by each individual must be consistent with the interests of the rest of the members of society. Thus, every member of society receives genuine opportunities for the comprehensive, full development of his inherent abilities and talents and free access to mankind’s storehouse of knowledge, experience, and other cultural values, as well as the leisure time to master this legacy.
The socialist revolution has laid the foundation for the emancipation of people in all spheres of social life. This process has been accelerated by the rapid growth of the productive forces, the development of the scientific and technological revolution, the improvement of social relations, and general cultural progress. In communist society freedom will be embodied in the creation of all the necessary conditions for the comprehensive, harmonious development of the individual. As Marx pointed out, under communism, beyond the realm of necessity (beyond the limits of material production), “begins that development of human energy, which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom only with this realm of necessity as its basis” (in K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 25, part 2, p. 387).
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E. A. ARAB-OGLY