Gilbert Ryle

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Ryle, Gilbert,

1900–1976, British philosopher. A graduate of Oxford, he became a tutor at Christ Church, Oxford, and later was Waynflete professor of metaphysical philosophy (1945–68) there. From 1947 to 1971 he was editor of the philosophical journal Mind. Like Ludwig WittgensteinWittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann
, 1889–1951, Austrian philosopher, b. Vienna. Life

Originally trained as an engineer, Wittgenstein turned to philosophy, went to Cambridge, where he studied (1912–13) with Bertrand Russell, and further developed his
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, Ryle was concerned with problems caused by the confusion of grammatical with logical distinctions. He pointed out the so-called category mistake, in which, usually because of a grammatical equivalence, two things are mistakenly treated as belonging to equivalent logical categories. In his Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle argued that the mind is not a nonphysical substance residing in the body, "a ghost in a machine," but a set of capacities and abilities belonging to the body. All references to the mental must be understood, at least theoretically, in terms of witnessable activities. His other works include Dilemmas (1954), Plato's Progress (1966), and Collected Papers (2 vol., 1971).


See G. Pitcher and O. Wood, ed., Ryle (1971).

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(19) As Gilbert Ryle writes, "We learn how by practice, schooled indeed by criticism and example, but often quite unaided by any lessons in ...
El argumento mas familiar contra la alternativa A1 es el que Gilbert Ryle esgrime contra lo que el llama la 'leyenda intelectualista' (1945/6; 1949, 30-31).
The depsychologization of desire is traced more generally to an obsession with finding criteria of emotions (at the cost of a more developmental account), rationalism and intellectualism, a strong tendency to treat mental dispositions as a purely epistemic matter, but also to the lingering influences of one Gilbert Ryle. But Wollheim's repsychologization of desire--his attempt to lead desire and emotion away from the shadowy world of linguistic fundamentalism back to their psychological and natural home--is not merely a critical task.
The section on Gilbert Ryle does not cite his most important book, The Ghost in the Machine.
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However, Gilbert Ryle's perceptive remark that Locke invented common sense should remind us that this outcome didn't just happen but is the result of his genius and of his influence, which are comparable to Aristotle's.
Although the authors don't acknowledge it, the first two terms were coined by the philosopher Gilbert Ryle in his book The Concept of Mind, where he used the terms to differentiate knowing how to do something from knowing that something is the case (or propositional knowledge).
The resources relied upon to express these arguments are as supplied by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle. Part of the general point the authors of this book want to make is that these two philosophers have been misunderstood (an irony considering their project), such as by labelling them ' behaviourists'.
(7) Gilbert Ryle `Phenomenology versus The Concept of Mind', in Collected Papers, Vol.
A modern British philosopher, Gilbert Ryle, has called the soul "the ghost in the machine." That oft quoted phrase means, according to the philosopher, that no matter how closely one inspects a person, there is only flesh and blood.
One might claim, with Gilbert Ryle, that the phenomenal and experiential content of ethics, of that realm of knowledge that involves knowing "the difference between right and wrong,"(1) is so deeply interconnected with noncognitive aspects of experience - with caring and with doing - that the notions, of forgetting and recollection simply do not apply.
His view of mentality as nothing but abstractions derived from temporally extended public behavior-environment patterns, as opposed to covert inners known by way of amplification methodology, comes by way of thinking such as that of certain analytic behaviorists (e.g., Gilbert Ryle), the interbehavioral system of J.