IC3: Unless dualism has a similar problem in accounting for the existence of intentional states
(that is, a problem in providing an account in terms of relations among elements), there is a presumption that materialism is false.
And it might be thought that since one of the marks of intentionality is the possible absence of the object, then these relations are not really properly called intentional states
. Maybe they are some kind of hybrid of a propositional attitude and a non-mental relation--as, for example, in those theories which analyse seeing X in terms of having a visual experience with the propositional content that X is F (for some visible property F), plus some causal relationship to X itself.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE [section] 2.08(2) (barring the use of voluntary intoxication to negate the intentional state
The primary-normative aspect of fault makes it impossible to reduce fault to an intentional state
. The Supreme Court effectively acknowledged this fact in Tison v.
Seemings are intentional states
because they have propositional content.
A second worry is that the behaviour that is explained by beliefs and desires (and intentional states
in general) is typically a change in the way a subject is oriented with respect to the environment--movement towards milk, movement away from tigers, and so on.
Now, since Murphy also rejects immaterial essences, there also would not be any real, intrinsically intentional states
So, for the psychologist's purpose, they are the same intentional state
. But they cannot be the same intentional state
unless they have the same intentional content.
Though I don't hear the return to the tonic under that description, that return is the content of my intentional state
, and yet intentional contents are given precisely by the descriptions under which I perceive things.
Every intentional state
of the system would nonetheless be identified with a physical state of the system.
Bipartism is the common view that the nature of an intentional state
can be wholly explained in terms of (a) its horizontal relations with other such states (as well as peripheral inputs and outputs); and Co) its vertical relations with the world.
63) as an "intentional state
of direct awareness of the environment." Ben-Ze'ev makes a very convincing case for his nonreductionist, holistic, intuitively plausible, and empirically-grounded theory.