intentionality

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Related to Intentional state: Theory of intentionality

intentionality

  1. the purposiveness of human action. As SCHUTZ and the proponents of ETHNOMETHODOLOGY underline, intentionality does not, as sometimes suggested, consist only of a series of discrete purposes. It exists also in more ‘tacit’ forms of actor's ‘knowledgeability’ (i.e. in what GIDDENS (1984) terms PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE OR PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS), as well as in the DISCURSIVE CONSCIOUSNESS of the actor. See also STRATIFICATION MODEL OF SOCIAL ACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
  2. (PHILOSOPHY) for HUSSERL and SARTRE, the ‘reaching out towards an object’ involved in human consciousness.
References in periodicals archive ?
IC3: Unless dualism has a similar problem in accounting for the existence of intentional states (that is, a problem in providing an account in terms of relations among elements), there is a presumption that materialism is false.
And it might be thought that since one of the marks of intentionality is the possible absence of the object, then these relations are not really properly called intentional states. Maybe they are some kind of hybrid of a propositional attitude and a non-mental relation--as, for example, in those theories which analyse seeing X in terms of having a visual experience with the propositional content that X is F (for some visible property F), plus some causal relationship to X itself.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE [section] 2.08(2) (barring the use of voluntary intoxication to negate the intentional state of recklessness).
The primary-normative aspect of fault makes it impossible to reduce fault to an intentional state. The Supreme Court effectively acknowledged this fact in Tison v.
Seemings are intentional states because they have propositional content.
A second worry is that the behaviour that is explained by beliefs and desires (and intentional states in general) is typically a change in the way a subject is oriented with respect to the environment--movement towards milk, movement away from tigers, and so on.
Now, since Murphy also rejects immaterial essences, there also would not be any real, intrinsically intentional states for her.
So, for the psychologist's purpose, they are the same intentional state. But they cannot be the same intentional state unless they have the same intentional content.
Though I don't hear the return to the tonic under that description, that return is the content of my intentional state, and yet intentional contents are given precisely by the descriptions under which I perceive things.
Every intentional state of the system would nonetheless be identified with a physical state of the system.
Bipartism is the common view that the nature of an intentional state can be wholly explained in terms of (a) its horizontal relations with other such states (as well as peripheral inputs and outputs); and Co) its vertical relations with the world.
63) as an "intentional state of direct awareness of the environment." Ben-Ze'ev makes a very convincing case for his nonreductionist, holistic, intuitively plausible, and empirically-grounded theory.