joint-stock company(redirected from Joint-stock companies)
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a form of capital centralization and a fundamental organizational form of the capitalist enterprise as well. Joint-stock companies came into existence during the period of primitive accumulation of capital—for example, the British East India Company in 1600 and the Dutch East India Company in 1602. They became widespread in the epoch of premonopoly capitalism and under imperialism have become the dominant form of capitalist enterprise and the chief form of capitalist monopoly.
With the development of the capitalist mode of production a contradiction arises between the tendency toward ever larger enterprises and the limited size of individually owned capital. The organization of new enterprises requires enormous capital investments which greatly exceed both the private capital of the individual capitalist and the borrowing sources that may be available to him. This contradiction is resolved by the organization of a joint-stock company, which unites the separate amounts of capital owned by the individual shareholders into a single associated capital amount. The large amount of capital concentrated in a joint stock company permits large-scale enterprises to be organized whose capital investment needs would be beyond the powers of individual capitalists.
The joint-stock company first became the dominant form of capitalist enterprise in rail transport and credit (joint-stock banks). Subsequently, with the development of heavy industry and the high relative importance of fixed capital within the total capital of industrial enterprises and with the rise of the concentration and monopolization of industry, joint-stock companies become the dominant form of major enterprises in all branches of industry except agriculture. The importance of the joint-stock company in relation to all industrial enterprises in the United States in the period from 1904 to 1939 rose from 23.6 percent to 51.7 percent; in terms of industrial output, the share of the joint-stock company rose from 73.7 percent to 92.6 percent. Out of total earnings for all enterprises in the United States, 69 percent went to joint-stock companies in 1947 and 78 percent in 1962. During the decades of the 20th century thus far, the number of joint-stock companies and their capital holdings have increased significantly. In the United States from 1909 to 1963 the number of joint-stock companies rose from 262,000 to 1,323,000, and their total assets during the period 1926 to 1963 rose from $262 billion to $1.48 trillion. In England during the period 1884–1962 the number of joint-stock companies rose from 9,000 to 428,000, and their capital holdings rose from £500 million to £9,200 million.
In Germany in 1938 joint-stock companies with capital of over 100 million marks constituted 0.5 percent of all joint-stock companies and had 26 percent of the total capital held by such companies, but in West Germany in 1962 the relative importance of the major joint-stock companies had grown to 2.7 percent of all joint-stock companies and they held 53 percent of all joint-stock capital. In the age of imperialism the joint-stock company has become the most important instrument of monopoly rule and is widely used in the merging of industrial and banking capital and in the formation of monopolistic conglomerates, as well as in introducing exported capital from the advanced capitalist countries into the economies of other countries.
With the development of state-monopoly capitalism, joint-stock companies are the form taken by state enterprises as well as joint state and private capitalist enterprises.
V. I. Lenin first revealed the importance of joint-stock companies in the age of imperialism; he showed that they served as an important instrument of rule by the financial oligarchy, which disposes of enormous amounts of other people’s capital through its control over joint-stock companies and thus appropriates an overwhelming proportion of the surplus value. Lenin’s disclosure of the importance of joint-stock companies has been fully confirmed over the subsequent half century, but the mechanism of rule by the financial oligarchy in itself has grown extremely complex in the chief imperialist countries, especially after World War II.
The dispersion of corporate stocks among a large number of stockholders permits a small inner circle to be in command of the joint-stock company. Shares offered to a general stockholders meeting of the company may reach as much as 30 or 40 percent of the total number. To gain a majority of votes, usually no more than 15 to 20 percent of the shares are required.
Attracting new capital to the company by issuing bonds allows the share of the total effective capital owned by the group holding the controlling package of shares to be even smaller. In practice, especially in the United States and England, various kinds of juridical machinations take place through which the required size of the controlling block of shares is reduced even more. The majority or a considerable part of the so-called preferred stocks is accompanied by certain privileges, such as the right to be the first to receive dividends and to receive a fixed rate of dividends, but such shares do not give the right to vote, a right which accompanies only the common stock. As a result the controlling block of shares, consisting only of common stock, is made many times smaller than the total share capital. In other capitalist countries the controlling block is frequently created with the assistance of the big banks, which present to the general stockholders meeting shares that they hold as security deposits or which they have bought up temporarily on the stock exchange. In the United States the Morgan group for a long time completely controlled the United States Steel Corporation steel trust, whose share capital amounted to $1.25 billion, while owning only 4 percent of the corporate shares (1955). In the giant monopoly American Telephone and Telegraph, with a share capital of $14 billion, the 48 million shares are dispersed among 1.4 million shareholders. Control is held by the Morgans and Rockefellers, who along with other financial groups owned only 2.5 percent of all shares in the 1950’s.
Of decisive importance in strengthening the power of the financial oligarchy is the system of leverage of control. One company, the patron or parent company, acquires controlling blocks of shares in several other companies, the subsidiaries. These in turn acquire control of still other companies, and so forth. As a result the group dominating the parent company by means of a single controlling block of shares runs the affairs not only of the parent company but of the whole pyramidal system subordinated to that company. Along with this pyramidal structure of control the partial ownership system is expressed in interlocking controlling blocks of shares, which is the mutual ownership of controlling blocks of shares by two or more companies; this system is strengthened even more by the institution of controlling or holding companies, which are set up especially to acquire controlling blocks of shares in other companies, in which connection banking or industrial monopolies frequently organize multilevel holding pyramids.
On the basis of this system of leverage of control, the personal alliance of the controlling parties in joint-stock companies has become a very widespread phenomena. Many of the leading monopolists—and, under state-monopoly capitalism, leading managers as well—jointly share dozens of posts on the boards of directors of various corporations and banks, leaving these now and again to hold ruling positions in the government before returning to the arena of private capitalist monopoly. The leading monopolists bring prominent retired officials, both civilian and military, such as former cabinet ministers, generals, and admirals, into the ranks of their managers. These persons provide the monopolists with direct ties with the state apparatus, particularly for getting military contracts involving greatly inflated charges.
With the development of the system of leverage of control the joint-stock company functions either as a single enterprise juridically (as a trust in industry and as a banking chain with a network of branches among banking monopolies) or as a monopoly consisting of juridically separate companies linked by the system of leverage of control. The major industrial, transport, banking, and other monopolies primarily take the form of the “concern,” which in manufacturing, economic, and financial matters acts as a single entity. The concern, too, however, can serve as a form uniting different kinds of industries and other enterprises which are controlled by a single group of magnates with the aim of appropriating the greater part of the income of these enterprises without uniting them in terms of productive and economic functions. Finally, on the basis of the system of leverage of control, “super companies,” or financial-monopolistic groups, are formed. These do not embrace particular enterprises and banks of different kinds but extend their control over many monopolies in different branches of industry, transport, banking, and insurance.
The system of leverage of control makes it possible to evade restrictive legislation such as antitrust laws in the United States or the prohibitions against banks opening branches in other states.
The development of the joint-stock company, which facilitated a gigantic concentration of production, centralization of capital, and monopolization of the capitalist economy, sharply intensifies the basic contradiction in capitalism between the social character of production and the private capitalist form of appropriation. In the joint-stock company occurs a peculiar kind of “fettering of capital as private property within the frames of the capitalist mode of production itself,” wherein expropriation spreads “from the immediate producer to the smallest and intermediate capitalists . . . But this expropriation within the limits of the capitalist system itself is expressed in antagonistic form, in the form of the appropriation of social property by the few” (Karl Marx; see K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 25, part 1, pp. 479, 483). With the development of the joint-stock company the chief role in organizing and directing the productive process passes from the hands of the capitalist owner into those of the upper-echelon hired manager.
The apologists for imperialism depict the joint-stock company in distorted fashion as a means for the so-called democratization of capital. They describe the ownership of stocks by the petite bourgeoisie and by industrial and service workers, including office and professional people, as a way of including them in the blessings of capitalism. This thesis of the “democratization of capital” by means of the joint-stock company serves as one of the bases for the myth of the “transformation” of capitalism into “people’s” capitalism. Actually, as Lenin wrote, the “democratization” of stock ownership signifies that “in fact the power (and the income) of the millionaire-magnates over the capital of the ‘small fry’ is increased” (Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 23, p. 186).
The robbing of the rank-and-file stockholders by the controlling members of the company, chiefly the magnates of finance capital, is rooted in certain laws inherent in the capitalist system and is strengthened through financial, juridical, and commercial machinations by the actual bosses of the company. These laws are the division of profits into entrepreneurial earnings and interest on loans, the tendency of average profits and the average interest rate to decline with the growth of monopoly profits, and finally the valuing of all regular, nonworking income against the rate of interest on loans—that is, by the price of fictitious capital. The most typical and widely used expression of fictitious capital appears in securities—stocks, bonds, and mortgage bonds. These securities have a nominal value, which is marked on them, and a market value determined by the stock exchange. Thus if a dividend of $7.26 is paid on a $100 share and the interest rate is 3 percent, then the market value of the stock is $242 ($7.26÷[3x 100]). In practice the dividend is capitalized at a slightly higher value, let us say 3.3 percent; otherwise the investor would prefer to buy 3 percent bonds. Consequently the market value in practice is $220 ($7.26÷ [3.3 x 100]). If when a new joint-stock company is organized and $10 million is invested, with the profit rate being 7.2 percent and the indicated norm for the interest rate being 3.3 percent, the nominal value of the company’s shares of $10 million will actually be sold on the market at a price of roughly $22 million. The $12 million difference constitutes the founders’ profit, which is appropriated by the founders of the joint-stock company as well as by the banks which placed the new stocks on the market. Under monopoly conditions, with the existence of monopoly profits as a result of merger of previously independent companies, founders’ profits are increased sharply. Thus with a monopoly profit rate of 14.52 percent the market value of the stocks will reach $44 million and the founders’ profit will amount to $34 million.
The appropriation of this sum can occur in another way—by issuing stocks at market “value” rather than at the actual value of the capital invested in the company. In that case the share capital is established at $22 million, and the shares are sold at book value. Of these, $12 million worth of shares (or the earnings from them) go to the founders. This form of appropriation of founders’ profit, called “watering down of capital,” fictitiously reduces the size of profits (not absolutely but only relatively) and thus reduces the size of taxes on profits accordingly. For these and other reasons, “watering down” also occurs in existing companies.
In the same way the controllers of a joint-stock company can assure themselves of the appropriation of future monopoly profits which do not yet exist or the expected growth in such profits. For this purpose preferred stocks are issued providing for first payment of dividends but at a limited rate of 4 to 6 percent with a limited book value that is tolerable at the given level of profits. Thus with an invested capital of $10 million in a company and profits of $726,000, preferred stocks can be issued and sold having a limited dividend of 6 percent up to a valuation of $12.1 million; above that, common stocks which will remain in the hands of the founders may still be issued, up to a value of $3 million, for example. With the growth of monopoly profits the market value of common stocks rises precipitously and the entire increase goes to their owners. Thus the share they would receive from profits amounting to $1,452,000 would be $726,000, or a dividend of 24 percent, and the market value of their stocks would rise to seven times the book value; if profits come to $3 million, the share going to owners of common stock jumps to $2,274,000, their dividends exceed 70 percent of the whole profit, and the market value rises by a factor of 20. Although joint-stock companies pay out only part of their balance sheet profits, the dividends amount to enormous sums. In relation to the book value of common stocks, dividends of 60–100 percent and even higher have become characteristic for such large US corporations as the General Motors Corporation, du Pont de Nemours, and the Aluminum Company of America, which have an especially favorable relation for their owners of preferred to common stock. Accordingly the market value of the common stocks is 30 to 40 times greater than the book value and in certain cases even 100 times greater. To camouflage these gigantic profits and market prices, common stocks were split many times over a period of years and their book value was reduced from $100 to $5, to $1.67, and even to $1, while the market quotations for the $1.67 or $1 stocks went as high as $50–$100 and even higher.
Juridical machinations by the actual owners of the stock company are intertwined with and supplemented by their accounting manipulations. Those who control the company calculate their actual profits (or losses) in their bookkeeping operations and internal balance sheets, but in the published balance sheets they only show profits to the extent that they find necessary. The difference between actual profits and those shown in the published reports constitutes the hidden reserves (or in the case of a nonprofitable situation, the hidden losses). Bourgeois literature, in recognizing the existence of hidden reserves in stock companies, extols the “prudence and foresight” of the directors, contrasting that to the mass of stockholders who are indifferent to the company’s fate and who are “ready” simply to extract a larger dividend. From this point of view the bourgeois “science of private enterprise” has worked out the “financial policy of an enterprise,” its “dividend policies,” drawing generalizations from the practice of joint-stock companies and instructing future managers and bosses in these practices.
As Lenin showed, the published accounts in the final analysis reflect the very deepest contradiction of the age of imperialism, that between the magnates of finance capital and the ever more harshly exploited toiling masses, and the immediate contradiction between the actual controllers of the company and the rank-and-file stockholders who are robbed by them (see Lenin, Poln. sobr. soch., 5th ed., vol. 34, pp. 163, 166, 171–74).
The greater the profits of a company, the larger the part allocated to reserve capital (“open reserves”) and the smaller the part paid out in dividends. Reserve capital, which is usually earmarked by the statutes of the company for covering any losses and other specified purposes, has long since transcended its statutory limits in the case of the leading monopolies. Therefore the allocation of a growing amount of the revealed profits to increasing the functioning capital of the company is carried out under the pretext of “undistributed profits,” which in the case of US monopolies have reached a size two to four times that of the stock capital. To this must be added the increased amortization funds, which constitute a form of hidden reserves.
Open reserves and amortization funds have become the chief source for increasing the functioning fixed capital used for increased capital reinvestment among the leading US monopolies. “Net” declared profit—that is, profit after the deduction of income taxes—reaches levels of 15 to 28 percent of the total of stock and reserve capital, and amortization funds come to 50 to 60 percent of the estimated functioning fixed capital, which means that most capital needs are met through these two internal sources—that is, essentially through monopoly profits. All this gives the monopolies the opportunity to pay out enormous dividends on common stocks (where preferred stock is absent), using only 40–50 percent of the net declared profits. Where preferred stock exists with a fixed dividend of 4–6 percent, those who run the monopolies receive gigantic dividends of up to 60–100 percent or more on common stocks.
The “dividend policies” of major joint-stock companies are aimed at maintaining a stable market value for their stocks, with some tendency for them to rise. Stability of dividends, along with large open reserves, strengthens the market value of stocks and increases the company’s solvency, which in turn enlarges its possibilities for using credit and financing. At the same time all of this serves to enrich the real owners of the company personally on an enormous scale. For example, in the case of three large US companies, the General Motors Corporation, du Pont de Nemours, and the Aluminum Company of America, the small controlling blocks of common shares, virtually insignificant in their book value of $216 million altogether in 1955, were “worth” $8 billion on the stock exchange. These billions of fictitious capital represent real wealth and real income for the masters of these “financial empires,” since the billions express these masters’ real control over billions of assets (over $10 billion in the case of these corporations). For the true owners of the monopolies the $2–$3 million worth of bonuses paid annually to their higher-echelon servants—the managers, presidents, and vice-presidents of corporations, representing the “lower” rank of the present-day big bourgeoisie—pale into insignificance by comparison. Thus the notorious theory of the “managerial revolution” stands exposed as unfounded. This social layer, so characteristic of contemporary capitalism, does indeed direct the productive and economic processes of the giant monopolistic combinations. But the commanding positions are occupied as before by the now “invisible” true owners and masters of the finance and monopoly groups, who stand over the managers and who dispose of colossal sums of capital and appropriate the lion’s share of surplus value by ever more intensified financial control and shady machinations.
The masters of the monopolies extract enormous profits not only from their ownership of controlling blocks of shares but also through stock-exchange speculation on the ups and downs of the stocks of their “own” companies. The amount of fictitious capital, despite the general tendency for it to increase, is subject to sharp fluctuations at different stages of the economic cycle, inflating during booms and contracting during crises. The market value of stocks grows with increased dividends or even rumors of increased dividends, and it fluctuates in response to political events or conscious manipulations of the stock exchange by the rulers of the banking and industrial monopolies. It is precisely they who in all cases appropriate the enormous speculative gains at the expense of the rentier capitalists and with the outright robbing of the small stockholders.
All the activities of the joint-stock company, beginning with its founding, are organically linked with unlimited speculation and enormous, parasitic profit taking. Under the capitalist system there is no sharp dividing line between normally functioning stock companies and fraudulent stock companies organized simply to sell stocks quickly and at high prices to a gullible public before the scheming arrangements of the promoters are discovered. Thus in the mining industry, where the true nature of the deposits discovered is not known, the rapid rise in stock prices of the companies set up can either enrich or ruin the first stock purchasers. For example, the well-known US political figure Herbert Hoover made a fortune from the promotion of mining companies over a long period of years, but the stockholders of these companies lost $322 million.
A major source of personal enrichment for the real controllers of the joint-stock company lies in various commercial machinations, including the sale by owners to their “own” company of materials, equipment, patents, or mining rights at inflated prices or by ascribing unfounded values to them. The inflated prices are either written off as current losses, thus reducing the current profits of the company, or they are “canceled out” against the hidden reserves—that is, the camouflaged profits of preceding years.
One of the ways in which the magnates in charge of the joint-stock companies enrich themselves is by the financial reorganization of the company. The new operators carry out a two-way operation: they increase the stock capital by issuing new stock and they reduce the earlier stock capital, formally to the level of the losses causing bankruptcy but in fact to a much greater extent. The difference is made up by the hidden reserves not shown on the balance sheets, and the new owners extract their profits from these reserves.
The possibilities for financial and commercial machinations by the real owners are greatly increased by the system of leverage of control. The parent or holding company is not responsible juridically for the activities of the subsidiary beyond the book value of the controlling block of shares that it holds. All sorts of deals dictated by the personal interests of the real owners may be concluded between these companies. Thus, for example, all profits can be artificially concentrated in the leading company and used by the two owners for their own interests, while the subsidiary enterprise is brought to partial or complete bankruptcy.
Joint-stock companies arose in Russia in the prereform period. By 1861 there were 120 such companies (not including railroads), having a capital of 100 million rubles (of which 35 million rubles were in industry). By 1881 the number of such companies had increased to 635, and their capital had risen to 840 million rubles. The major stock capital and even greater sums in corporate bonds of the railroad companies were guaranteed by the government and were regarded in Russia as within the sphere of government credit for production.
During the economic boom of the 1890’s the number of joint-stock companies doubled, and their capital increased to 2.4 billion rubles; industrial capital alone tripled to 1.5 billion. By 1914 some 2,235 joint-stock companies had a capital of 4.7 billion rubles, of which 3.2 billion rubles were held by 1,621 industrial companies.
Joint-stock companies held the dominant position in manufacturing and industrial concerns in prerevolutionary Russia (accounting for 60 percent of their output) and were on the average much larger than such concerns in the United States and Germany.
Joint-stock companies were formed in the USSR in the 1920’s during the transition to the New Economic Policy. At that time they represented one of the forms of management of Soviet industry, trade, and banking, with joint participation in management by several economic organizations. After 1929–30 this form was replaced by those of state combinations, trusts, and retail trade administrations.
After World War II joint-stock companies were organized in several of the people’s democracies by the Soviet Union and the governments of these countries on the basis of joint-parity management. Their aim was to develop the main industrial branches with the participation and aid of the USSR. With the accomplishment of this goal, these joint companies were liquidated and the Soviet Union transferred its share in them to the governments concerned on favorable terms.
I. F. GINDIN
The joint-stock company in civil law. Civil law in the bourgeois states regards the joint-stock company as an association having these features: the recognition of its juridical status as an individual, material liability exclusively limited to the property belonging to it, and the subdivision of its capital into shares.
The procedure for founding and operating a joint-stock company is regulated in detail by the legislation of all capitalist countries—for example, in France by the law on commercial associations of 1966, in West Germany by the law on joint-stock companies of 1967, and in England by the law on companies of 1967. The formation of a joint-stock company begins with the drawing up of statutes by the founders. These are supposed to be drawn up in a form approved by a court or a notary, and the law supervises not only the form but also the content of the statutes. English law requires not statutes but two documents: the company memorandum (the term joint-stock company is not used in English law), which regulates the external relations of the company, and the internal regulations, which govern the relations between the investors and the company. In addition to requiring the drawing up of statutes, the laws of most capitalist countries require that all the fixed (share) capital be specified, with a certain legally set amount of the capital being paid in.
The company’s fixed capital is specified by its statutes, and therefore it is called statutory capital. Since one of the functions of the fixed capital is to defend the interest of the creditors, the law forbids shares being issued at a price lower than their book value, it prescribes obligatory payment of a part of the value of all the shares set by law, and so forth. The fall of the amount of fixed capital to a level lower than that specified by law is regarded as grounds for liquidating the company.
The laws of most capitalist states, with the exception of England and the United States, specify a minimal size for fixed capital. An increase in its size is brought about by issuing new stocks or by increasing the assigned statutory value of the previously issued stocks.
The company’s fixed capital can be formed either by presenting the stocks for public subscription or by distributing them among the founders, the latter method becoming more and more widely used. In England, depending on the way in which share capital is formed, two types of companies are distinguished—public and private; the number of private companies is significantly higher.
Membership in a joint-stock company entails personal and proprietary rights for the stockholder. Among the personal rights are the right to participate in general stockholders meetings and the right to membership in the governing bodies of the company. Among the proprietary rights are the right to receive annual profit in the form of dividends and the right to receive part of the property of the company in the event of its dissolution, if any property remains for distribution among the stockholders after the demands of creditors are met.
The next stage in the founding of a joint-stock company is the holding of the first meeting of the future stockholders, at which the governing bodies of the company are elected. The company is considered to be in existence from the moment of its obligatory registration at the registry of firms.
American and English law consider the organs of the company to be the general meeting and the board of directors. There are also inspectors or auditors. In West German law the joint-stock company must have a general meeting, a board of directors, a supervisory board, and auditors. In France the law allows the company to have either a general meeting, board of directors (administrative council), and inspectors (commissaires) or a general meeting, directorate, supervisory council, and commissaires.
The company’s board of directors is the body having jurisdiction over the management of the company’s affairs and over its representation in external matters. The board of directors is usually appointed by the general meeting of stockholders and in West Germany by the supervisory council. In France when a company has a supervisory council, the council appoints the directorate. Although the law in all capitalist states assigns the functions of management and representation of the company to the board of directors, in fact these functions are given over by the board of directors to one or several of its own members.
The supervisory council as an organ of the joint-stock company is known in West German, French, and Japanese law. It not only controls the activity of the board of directors but also resolves management questions. In West Germany certain functions of representing the company externally are also assigned to the supervisory council.
The general stockholders meeting is the main organ of the company only in a formal sense. The limitation of the sphere of competence of the general stockholders meeting in legal respects, as well as the possibility of proxy votes, deprives the ordinary stockholder of the possibility of influencing the activities of the company. The general stockholders meetings are called by the board of directors and as a rule on its initiative. However, they can also be called at the demand of stockholders holding a certain amount, specified by law, of the fixed capital. The law of all countries allows for election of inspectors by the general meeting. Their job includes examining the board of directors’ accounts and the company’s books, inventory, securities, and so on.
A joint-stock company’s functioning is terminated when the period of time for which it was created runs out; when the general stockholders meeting passes a resolution by a qualified majority as specified by law; when the company is declared bankrupt; or when the appropriate government bodies so order. According to law in many capitalist countries the concentration of stocks in the hands of a single stockholder is not a basis for terminating the company. In France the accumulation of all stocks in the hands of a single stockholder does not entail the termination of the company either, but any interested person can demand the company’s activity be terminated if such a situation continues for longer than one year.
V. V. ZAITSEVA
REFERENCESMarx, K. Kapital, vols. 1 and 3. In K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch., 2nd ed., vol. 23, ch. 24; vol. 25, part 1, ch. 27; vol. 25, part 2, ch. 29.
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Gindin, I. F. “Balansy aktsionernykh predpriiatii kak istoricheskii istochnik.” In Maloissledovannye istochniki po istorii SSSR XIX-XX vv. Moscow, 1964. Pages 74–147.
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Strumilin, S. G. Problemy promyshlennogo kapitala ν SSSR. Moscow, 1925. Chapter 1 and appendixes.
Shepelev, L. E. “Aktsionernoe uchreditel’stvo ν Rossii.” In lz istorii imperializma ν Rossii. Moscow, 1959. Pages 134–183.
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Promyshlennost’ i banki ν Iaponii. Moscow, 1956.
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Mirovye ekonomicheskie krizisy, vol. 3.
Trakhtenberg, I. Denezhnye krizisy (1821–1938). Moscow, 1939. (Statistical supplements on England, the United States, and Germany.)
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Somary, F. Bankpolitik. Tübingen, 1915. 3rd ed., Tübingen, 1934. Homberger, H. Die stillen Reserven bei der Aktiensgesellschaft. Zürich, 1919.
Lincoln, E. E. Problems in Business Finance. Chicago. 1921. Dewing, A. The Financial Policy of Corporations. New York, 1920, 1926.
Calmes, A. Administration financiére des entreprises et des sociétés. Paris, 1925.
Schmalenbach, E. Finanzierungen, 4th ed. Leipzig, 1928.
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Frey, E. Der englische Kapitalmarkt mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung der Finanzierung der englischen Industrie. Zürich, 1938.
Weber, K. Dividendenpolitik. Zürich, 1955.