Rather, to gain part of the monopoly rent
, politicians can threaten either to impose costly regulation or to remove regulations that help firms.
Our model economy is perfectly competitive, and thus incumbents do not earn any monopoly rent
that can be transferred to new entrants.
The government is simply an agent to facilitate an internal transfer between the citizens of a nation-state, who have collectively consented to an artificial monopoly, in order to create the monopoly rent
incentive to spur its inventive citizens to action.
A 'media patent' over a sport would create the same type of incentive, securing a monopoly rent
by excluding competitive entry, thereby furnishing a long-term incentive to develop the sport rather than exploit it.
DP: In Rebel Cities, you talk about monopoly rent
and the contradictions inherent in that process.
answering this question: (1) the single monopoly rent
theorem and (2)
Business persons who find themselves in monopoly positions may be able to profit handsomely (so-called monopoly rent
) in terms of income.
It is also inherent in our previous assertion that monopoly rent
, which includes both the resource rent and excess profits, exceeds the resource rent obtained in the competitive market.
Licensing Exclusivity, Transfer Costs, Monopoly Rent
, Tacit Knowledge, Intellectual Property, Power Distance, Network Externality
In the European market environment, where exchange monopolies are still prevalent, the real owners of the liquidity are now questioning a structure where they provide their liquidity to a monopoly that then charges monopoly rent
prices to trade on its system, takes the resulting trading data and sells it back to the original liquidity provider for a sizeable profit.
'There is no doubt that [they] have some positive economic impact, but the economics of it are not what people say they are.' Because the Olympics are unique, the IOC is able to extract 'monopoly rent
,' he added.
This paper argues that there are strong economic arguments for treating monopoly rent
as a social detriment, that any "public benefit test" should so treat them, and that the argument most commonly advanced in New Zealand for the "total surplus standard"--that welfare economics provides no secure reason in principle for comparing the gains of monopolists with the losses of consumers--provides no good reason for policymakers to ignore transfers, and altogether misses the really important economic arguments for regulating monopoly rents
out of existence.