ordinary language philosophy


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ordinary language philosophy

a detailed analysis of language in use. Also referred to as linguistic philosophy (or analysis), and Oxford philosophy the term applies to a group of Oxford philosophers (including Austin and Ryle) influenced by the philosophy of WITTGENSTEIN. The aim of this ordinary language philosophy is to analyse natural language as a flexibly rule-governed practice. This approach contrasts with that of the logical positivists (see LOGICAL POSITIVISM), who wished to rid language of metaphysics by reducing it to an ‘object language’ capable of rigorous logical investigation. Ordinary language philosophers prefer to dissolve rather than solve problems, demonstrating that puzzlement often occurs only when metaphysics is used. Their own image of it is as a form of philosophy dispelling linguistic confusions, a view reflected in the title of Austin's How to Do Things with Words (1962).

Approaches in sociology which emphasize the importance of everyday language and talk (e.g. ETHNOMETHODOLOGY and CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS), have been influenced by ordinary language philosophy (see also SPEECH ACTS).

References in periodicals archive ?
(8) Of course, ordinary language philosophy, like phenomenology, is not a monolithic tradition.
By the late 1950s it must have have been clear to Ross that the influence of logical positivism was gradually waning and that ordinary language philosophy was the new philosophy du jour.
The tradition of conceptual analysis in Ordinary Language Philosophy includes many more methods (ranging from substitution tests over the controversial paradigm case arguments to contrastive analysis and rephrasing by assertability conditions, inter alia).
The key words in the first feature of ordinary language philosophy, as italicized above, suggest that there are other uses of language, which are not ordinary, not common and not collective.
Narrative links the great varieties of human action, described by Ordinary Language Philosophy and pragmatism into the imagination "emplotments"(21) of narrative schemata.
This paper critically examines the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discusses the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.
The shared presupposition that philosophical questions cannot be completely divorced from conceptual ones was but the scene upon which numerous battles (including meta-philosophical ones) were fought, and whilst so-called 'ordinary language philosophy' is dismissed by many contemporary philosophers, very few of them would be foolish enough to maintain that philosophical questions may be completely separated from conceptual ones.
In a way this is ironic, since in Speech Acts Searle accused ordinary language philosophy of confusing conditions of semantic content with conditions of illocutionary mode.
The last movement to be discussed, often referred to as the "Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy," despite the fact that two of its main founders, Ludwig Wittgenstein and G.
Thus, a number of essays introduce their topic by demonstrating the inherent political bent of Cavell's innovative approach to ordinary language philosophy: that to speak to another human being is to make a claim upon that person, or, in the words of Andrew Norris, 'the claim of reason that is Cavell's central theme and the title of his magnum opus is itself a claim to community' (2).
On this basis, his "later philosophy" is generally regarded as a version of "ordinary language philosophy." He is taken to criticize philosophers for making ("metaphysical") statements which deviate in different ways from the everyday use of some of their component expressions.
He argued that Wittgenstein undertook metaphysical ordinary language philosophy as he reduced ordinary language to the phenomenalist language of sense-data.