ordinary language philosophy


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ordinary language philosophy

a detailed analysis of language in use. Also referred to as linguistic philosophy (or analysis), and Oxford philosophy the term applies to a group of Oxford philosophers (including Austin and Ryle) influenced by the philosophy of WITTGENSTEIN. The aim of this ordinary language philosophy is to analyse natural language as a flexibly rule-governed practice. This approach contrasts with that of the logical positivists (see LOGICAL POSITIVISM), who wished to rid language of metaphysics by reducing it to an ‘object language’ capable of rigorous logical investigation. Ordinary language philosophers prefer to dissolve rather than solve problems, demonstrating that puzzlement often occurs only when metaphysics is used. Their own image of it is as a form of philosophy dispelling linguistic confusions, a view reflected in the title of Austin's How to Do Things with Words (1962).

Approaches in sociology which emphasize the importance of everyday language and talk (e.g. ETHNOMETHODOLOGY and CONVERSATIONAL ANALYSIS), have been influenced by ordinary language philosophy (see also SPEECH ACTS).

References in periodicals archive ?
In this sense (though not in others), ordinary language philosophy aims to provide lexical definitions of the terms they study.
The tradition of conceptual analysis in Ordinary Language Philosophy includes many more methods (ranging from substitution tests over the controversial paradigm case arguments to contrastive analysis and rephrasing by assertability conditions, inter alia).
According to Barry Hallen, the thesis of an ordinary language philosophy is characterized as follows: "(1) an emphasis upon ordinary, common and collective uses of language; and (2) greater importance being attached to description and to analysis rather than to criticism" (xxvi).
Narrative links the great varieties of human action, described by Ordinary Language Philosophy and pragmatism into the imagination "emplotments"(21) of narrative schemata.
This paper critically examines the methodology of informal experiments employed in ordinary language philosophy and much of contemporary philosophy of language and linguistics, and discusses the role that experimenter bias can play in influencing judgments about informal and formal linguistic experiments.
I admit that my own capacity for metaphorical identification may not allow me to put myself in the place of a 'largely unreconstructed advocate' (36) of ordinary language philosophy, as Cohen calls himself.
The last movement to be discussed, often referred to as the "Oxford school of ordinary language philosophy," despite the fact that two of its main founders, Ludwig Wittgenstein and G.
In a way this is ironic, since in Speech Acts Searle accused ordinary language philosophy of confusing conditions of semantic content with conditions of illocutionary mode.
The second essay by Sandra Laugier expands upon Norris' introduction through an examination of Wittgenstein's similar understanding of the political undertones of ordinary language philosophy.
His philosophical training and teaching career spanned the period from the logical empiricism of the 1940s to the "cognitive revolution" of the 1980s and early 1990s, running intermediately through the heydays (and wanings) of the philosophy of the later Wittgenstein, ordinary language philosophy, conceptual analysis, post-empiricist naturalism, and modal metaphysics.
He argued that Wittgenstein undertook metaphysical ordinary language philosophy as he reduced ordinary language to the phenomenalist language of sense-data.