Vladimir Sukhomlinov

(redirected from Sukhomlinov)

Sukhomlinov, Vladimir Aleksandrovich

 

Born Aug. 4 (16), 1848; died Feb. 2, 1926, in Berlin. Russian military figure. General of the cavalry (1906).

Sukhomlinov graduated from the Nicholas Cavalry School in 1867 and the Academy of the General Staff in 1874. He fought in the Russo-Turkish War of 1877–78, commanding a cavalry regiment and a division. From 1886 to 1897 he was director of the Officers’ Cavalry School. He became chief of staff in 1899, deputy commander in 1902, and troop commander in 1904 of the Kiev military district. Beginning in 1905, Sukhomlinov also served as governor-general of Kiev, Volyn’, and Podol’sk provinces. In December 1908 he became chief of the General Staff, and in March 1909, minister of war.

A reactionary, Sukhomlinov was a shrewd courtier, which furthered his career. He carried out several military reforms in the period 1905–12, despite which the army remained unprepared for an extended war. Sukhomlinov was dismissed in June 1915, after Russian troops suffered defeats at the front in World War I. In March 1916 he was arrested on a charge of abuses and treason in connection with the conviction for espionage of several of his associates, including S. Miasoedov and A. Al’tshuller. After six months of imprisonment he was transferred to house arrest. After the February Revolution of 1917 he was arrested again, and in September 1917 he was given a life sentence at hard labor as punishment for the unpreparedness of the army; the sentence was later commuted to confinement in a fortress.

On May 1, 1918, in view of his advanced age (70), Sukhomlinov was released from prison. He emigrated to Finland and later to Germany. He was the author of Recollections (1924).

References in periodicals archive ?
Electronic auction: acquisition for a citizen from the number of orphans and children left without parental care (for sukhomlinov roman evgenievich) housing for municipal property for inclusion in a specialized housing stock
Meanwhile, the pre-1914 war minister, General Vladimir Aleksandrovich Sukhomlinov (1848-1926), displayed a keen interest in intelligence that dated at least to his previous tenure as chief of the Kiev military district.
Already on 12/25 November 1912, War Minister Sukhomlinov had advised the tsar that, "it is scarcely advantageous for us on our own initiative to bare the sword against Germany." (63) And, Russia had no equivalent of the German Zustand der drohenden Kriegsgefahr (threatening danger of war), a pre-mobilization period that provided for enhanced military readiness measures short of large-scale reserve troop call-ups.
During the crisis of late 1912, both Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaevich (1856-1929), future commander-in-chief of Russian armies in the field, and War Minister Sukhomlinov held that war with Austria-Hungary also likely meant war with Germany, possibly Turkey, and even Romania.
On November 22, 1912, Russia's war minister, Sukhomlinov, prepared orders for a full-on yet 'partial' mobilization of the military districts of Warsaw (that is Russian Poland, targeting Austrian Galicia), Kiev (Russian Ukraine, targeting same), and, intriguingly, Odessa (from which an amphibious operation in Constantinople might be launched)." McMeekin believes that the most fascinating aspect of this move was that it was "almost identical to the one that would be mooted in July 1914 ...
Starring: Konstantin Milovanov, Elizaveta Arzamasova and Denis Sukhomlinov.
Sukhomlinov, the minister of war, struggled with fiscal conservatives like V.N.
(125) Or, as Major General Sergei Konstantinovich Dobrorol'skii (1860-C.1930), the 1914-chief of the GUGSh mobilization section, put it, "given the slowness of our operational work and the difficulty of any changes in mass railroad transits, the partial mobilization of four districts was in general staff perspective completely impermissible and threatened catastrophe should general mobilization follow partial mobilization." (126) Yet, at the outset of the July Crisis, War Minister Sukhomlinov interposed no objection to partial mobilization.
Meanwhile, during the crisis of late 1912, War Minister Sukhomlinov had informed the tsar that a partial mobilization might be implemented only within separate military districts.
Sukhomlinov (1848-1926), published in 1925, (1) the only biography of him is that written by General Iu.N.
In his book The Eastern Front, Norman Stone linked the refusal to withdraw to the opposition of the Grand Duke and his supporters before the war to Sukhomlinov's plan to decommission the Russian fortresses in Poland.