intentionality

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Related to Theory of intentionality: Intentional state

intentionality

  1. the purposiveness of human action. As SCHUTZ and the proponents of ETHNOMETHODOLOGY underline, intentionality does not, as sometimes suggested, consist only of a series of discrete purposes. It exists also in more ‘tacit’ forms of actor's ‘knowledgeability’ (i.e. in what GIDDENS (1984) terms PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE OR PRACTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS), as well as in the DISCURSIVE CONSCIOUSNESS of the actor. See also STRATIFICATION MODEL OF SOCIAL ACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
  2. (PHILOSOPHY) for HUSSERL and SARTRE, the ‘reaching out towards an object’ involved in human consciousness.
References in periodicals archive ?
For a general theory of intentionality, Kriegel also needs a theory of non-experiential intentionality.
Mandik's original view of things is attractive precisely because it remains a purely formal theory of intentionality (A is about B just in virtue of their resemblance), and so it seems to avoid this circularity.
Five ways Patricia can kill her husband; a theory of intentionality and blame.
Albertazzi makes an interesting move here by denying that Brentano ever sought to advance a theory of intentionality, as opposed to a theory of intentional reference, by which Albertazzi translates Brentano's phrase intentionale Beziehung for what might otherwise be rendered as "intentional relation." If it is true that Brentano never meant to put forward a theory of intentionality, then he might be exempt from answering such sticky questions as how intentional states can contain their objects immanently within themselves.
O'Shea then moves on to a discussion of the epistemology and metaphysics of mind that Sellars develops on the basis of his theory of intentionality. Reversing the order of exposition in Sellars's classic "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind," O'Shea discusses first Sellars's seminal idea that our conception of and access to the mental is like that afforded by a theory that utilizes a publicly accessible phenomenon (in this case, language use) as the model for an explanation of some unobservable domain.