The German term is especially associated with the work of Max WEBER, who stated as ‘the specific task of the sciences of action,…the interpretation of action in terms of its subjective meaning’ (Weber, 1922), distinguishing the social sciences from the natural sciences by the presence of such an orientation.
A confusion exists in the literature -illustrating the problems that can arise in any understanding of meanings! – as to whether in Weber's use Verstehen refers only to a doubtful psychologistic and ‘introspective’, ‘empathic’ understanding, in which the sociologist merely ‘imagines’ herself or himself in the place of a person or group, or whether – something capable of far more ‘objective’ evaluation – actors’ 'subjective meanings’ can be ‘read off from the existence of an explicit ‘language’ of social meanings which can be objectively demonstrated.
In fact, Weber's usage would appear to have involved elements of both of these possibilities, but in the former case he endeavoured to found any ‘existential’ psychological assumptions involved in ‘empirical regularities of experience’. Nevertheless, there remain some critics who, wrongly, see Weber's, and any, use of Verstehen as only involving a doubtful introspective psychology (e.g. Abel, 1977). While others (e.g. WINCH, 1958, or Macintyre, 1962) argue that it would have been better if Weber had confined his use of Verstehen to meaningful understanding in the second sense, and not sought to merge meaningful understanding and ‘causal explanation’.
What Weber meant by ‘causal explanation’ in the context of actors’ meanings is another issue: either these could refer: