The "Assessment of APAC Automotive Aftermarket, 2018" report has been added to ResearchAndMarkets.com's offering.
The study provides an analysis of the automotive aftermarket outlook in the region with a focus on key markets including China, Australia, India, Japan, Thailand, and Indonesia.
"Competition, Monopoly, and Aftermarkets." National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 8086, 2001.
Shapiro, C., "Aftermarkets and Consumer Welfare: Making Sense of Kodak." Antitrust Law Journal, 63, 1995, 483-504.
The focus on aftermarkets and systems competition for the American Antitrust Institute's 2006 invitational symposium was generally prompted by current developments in technology, standard-setting, and intellectual property and the recurrence of relatively new kinds of aftermarket restraints involving variations of classic tying arrangements, different types of refusals to deal and bundled pricing arrangements that together are redefining aftermarkets in ways not previously receiving much attention within the antitrust community.
The foregoing developments and issues in aftermarkets possess the potential of restricting competition through increasing the costs of independent providers to gain access to OEM parts and specifications on terms that would permit them to flourish competitively.
Global demand for automotive aftermarket
products is projected to increase five percent per year through 2007 to US$144 billion.
(also called "secondary markets") comprise the markets for complementary products (or what are often labeled "secondary products or services") that are often purchased subsequent to the purchase of another, related product (termed the "primary product or service").
The Chicago view also contends that there are several procompetitive reasons why a company may want to monopolize its aftermarket
. These procompetitive theories are typically employed to argue that interference in aftermarkets
by antitrust authorities will lead to inefficient enforcement that reduces customer welfare.
Since the Kodak decision makes it very clear that plaintiffs are entitled to a full opportunity to conduct discovery necessary to withstand defendants' summary judgment motions, lower courts and antitrust practitioners can expect future antitrust cases involving aftermarkets
to involve more discovery and more analysis than has hitherto been the case.