Negative exceptive conditionals are important expressions in everyday life commonly used to refer to exceptive situations, such as, 'no conduzcas el coche a menos que / excepto si / salvo si / a no ser que estes sobrio' (in English: 'do not drive the car unless / except if you are sober'), with the most common negative exceptive conditionals in the Spanish language being: excepto si, salvo si, a no ser que and a menos que.
Another point of disagreement about the negative exceptive conditional has to do with the fact that for some authors, certain exceptive conditionals are semantically equivalent to others.
On the other hand, Suppositional theory (Evans & Over, 2004; Evans, Over, & Handley, 2005) has claimed that the comprehension of
conditionals leads to the construction of a single mental model or possibility (singularity principle).
Several prominent theories of
conditional reasoning argue that reasoners compute and use
conditional probability information to engage in
conditional reasoning processes, which suggests that naive reasoners should be at least somewhat sensitive to the factors that affect
conditional probability.
Surprisingly, David Pipe is without a
conditional jockey and he's advertising for a suitably ambitious, and talented, youngster to plug the void.
The difference between the two types of
conditionals is in the mood of the verb.
The mental representations that participants construct for these kinds of
conditionals have been inferred from two phenomena: the directional effect and the valence effect.
Often, the
conditionals in (5b) and (5c) are called "subjunctive" or "counterfactual"
conditionals, but as Comrie (1986: 89-93) has convincingly argued,
conditional constructions like (5b) and (5c) are not inherently counterfactual, but differ in degree of hypotheticality.
(In fact, Adams was Suppes's first student.) Suppes' first contribution, "Some questions about Adams'
conditionals," considers some issues related to Adams's probabilistic analysis of
conditionals.
Whether or not one can explicate
conditionals in terms of
conditional probability, it's a further question whether or not Adams, Thesis is correct, this being the thesis that the probability of "If A, then B" equals the
conditional probability of B given A - where probability is construed as degree of (rational) belief (see Adams 1975, p.
Taking into account the attention to
conditional constructions, it is possible to conclude that they are still not enough studied from the universal typological position [6].
