First, if I am right about the state of the dialectic prior to the present article, it was in no way obvious that a defensible expressivist theory of talk of normative credences would be sufficient for the expressivist to make sense of the possibility of fundamental normative error.
A second lesson is that we do in fact need an expressivist theory of normative credences. If I am right that the best strategy for meeting Egan's challenge makes free use of the idea of assigning such credences, then one response to Smith's challenge should to that extent be off the table.
The Principal Principle tells us to confirm our credences to the chances.
The Principal Principle relates credences about chances to credences about occurrences.
I want to offer a toy example of my own to show that in such an intermediate case, NP mandates credences
that are manifestly un-Humean.
Values and credences
belong to propositions: classes of maximally specific possibilities (perhaps egocentric and tensed).
His desiredness function will also have evolved accordingly to reflect these changes in his credences
. For Frederic to exhibit harmony in this new credal state it will have to be the case that his new desires ([D.sub.1]) are aligned appropriately with his new credences
Frege's Puzzle and the Objects of Credence
, DAVID J.
In his "A Subjectivist's Guide to Objective Chance," David Lewis argues persuasively that a certain relationship holds between reasonable credence
and objective chance (1980).(1) Both items involve varieties of probability: in the case of credence
, we use subjective probability to describe gradations in degree of belief; in the case of chance, we use objective probability to describe irreducibly indeterministic processes (e.g., radioactive decay).