discursive consciousness

discursive consciousness

‘what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action’ (GIDDENS, 1984). For Giddens, it is important to notice that such consciousness is not all that actors ‘know’, that alongside ‘discursive knowledge’ there also exists PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE: what every actor knows, and needs to know, to get around in the social world, but cannot always express. See also STRATIFICATION MODEL OF SOCIAL ACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
References in periodicals archive ?
Despite, however, his emphasis on the actualization of mindedness in rule-following as a rationally endorsable achievement, Hegel also notes a persistent difficulty or lack of transparency that attaches to the achievement of apperceptively unified, rule-following discursive consciousness.
Second, it is difficult to deny that human beings possess discursive consciousness and that they often enough think and act according to norms.
61) As Morris puts it, for Hegel discursive consciousness or "understanding is no mere faculty, but a self-conscious activity oriented by living interests, an activity that surpasses singular interests through the life of a community.
The nature of social knowledge, according to Giddens (1984), is represented in three different forms: practical consciousness, discursive consciousness and the unconscious.
Wittgenstein's treatment of aspect-seeing offers us a way of thinking about human discursive consciousness that is an elucidatory redescription of what we do when we employ concepts within acts of seeing (Wittgenstein places the idea of a person as an agent among agents at the center of thinking about discursive consciousness).
Between them they compose a history of the ethical, which begins with a recognition of how average discursive consciousness defeats the moral, and continues through a painful and not fully resolved account of the conditions of moral awareness and human interconnection.
But it is here, also, that the self begins; Bellow understands the modern self as formed in discursive consciousness.
The pathology of discursive consciousness is, for Bellow, the difficulty that it has in looking beyond itself, in moving beyond the order of its own formulations.
Because, for Bellow, childhood can supply a model of pure attention, it is not surprising that Herzog's journey away from the pathology of discursive consciousness begins in memory.
What we should expect to learn from this struggle, especially as it is played out in (Verene's) Hegel, is thus not which side can subsume the other but, rather, what the conditions of our discursive consciousness are.
Herzog's journey is not from an outer to an inner reality, but from his self-awareness as discursive consciousness outwards to the otherness of the world.
Herzog dramatizes, in one man, the overcoming of the pathology of discursive consciousness through memory and acts of attention.