discursive consciousness

discursive consciousness

‘what actors are able to say, or to give verbal expression to, about social conditions, including especially the conditions of their own action’ (GIDDENS, 1984). For Giddens, it is important to notice that such consciousness is not all that actors ‘know’, that alongside ‘discursive knowledge’ there also exists PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE: what every actor knows, and needs to know, to get around in the social world, but cannot always express. See also STRATIFICATION MODEL OF SOCIAL ACTION AND CONSCIOUSNESS.
References in periodicals archive ?
Despite, however, his emphasis on the actualization of mindedness in rule-following as a rationally endorsable achievement, Hegel also notes a persistent difficulty or lack of transparency that attaches to the achievement of apperceptively unified, rule-following discursive consciousness. Except at the final stages of free and rational life, yet also possible even then in various regressions or flaws or copy errors, "all consciousness," Hegel writes, "contains a unity and a dividedness, hence a contradiction.
Second, it is difficult to deny that human beings possess discursive consciousness and that they often enough think and act according to norms.
(61) As Morris puts it, for Hegel discursive consciousness or "understanding is no mere faculty, but a self-conscious activity oriented by living interests, an activity that surpasses singular interests through the life of a community." Morris, "Hegel on the Life of the Understanding," 418.
The nature of social knowledge, according to Giddens (1984), is represented in three different forms: practical consciousness, discursive consciousness and the unconscious.
Eldridge argues that Wittgenstein's work fits into the tradition of philosophical investigations of the nature and basis of discursive consciousness: Wittgenstein connects his investigation of aspect-seeing more closely with the learning of language than might initially meet the eye.
Between them they compose a history of the ethical, which begins with a recognition of how average discursive consciousness defeats the moral, and continues through a painful and not fully resolved account of the conditions of moral awareness and human interconnection.
But it is here, also, that the self begins; Bellow understands the modern self as formed in discursive consciousness. We know ourselves as a specific discursive practice, and we know the world as that practice forms it for us.
The pathology of discursive consciousness is, for Bellow, the difficulty that it has in looking beyond itself, in moving beyond the order of its own formulations.
To read the world as one's own text is part of the pathology of discursive consciousness; believing that it sees, even understands, the world, such a consciousness sees only its own inscription.
What we should expect to learn from this struggle, especially as it is played out in (Verene's) Hegel, is thus not which side can subsume the other but, rather, what the conditions of our discursive consciousness are.
Herzog's journey is not from an outer to an inner reality, but from his self-awareness as discursive consciousness outwards to the otherness of the world.
Herzog dramatizes, in one man, the overcoming of the pathology of discursive consciousness through memory and acts of attention.