On the other hand, when the relation between the major ([phrase omitted]) and the minor term ([phrase omitted]) is not one of primary-universality, nothing seems to prevent us from demonstrating the same explanandum/major term with two syllogisms with distinct middle terms as explanantia.
If it is demonstrated in virtue of a sign ([phrase omitted]) or incidentally ([phrase omitted]), nothing prevents the existence of several explanantia for the same attribute.
The problem for orthodox/ scientific naturalism, Hornsby argues, is that of "locating" the explanantia and explananda of commonsense psychological explanations within this sequence of events.
Now, of course, what Hornsby really wants to do is to establish that there is no correspondence between mental explanantia and neural causes that would enable the former to be "located" in the sequence of events that eventuates in a bodily movement.
Hornsby, we have seen, attempts to secure this thesis by arguing that the explanantia and explananda of commonsense psychological explanations have no neurophysical counterparts.