Discussions range over (A) philosophy at Harvard in the early 1930s, (B) naturalism, (C) naturalized epistemology, (D) "Two Dogmas of Empiricism", (E) extensionalism, and (F) ontological relativity.
The third topic worth emphasizing is the interesting, if difficult, discussion regarding extensionalism, properties, and events.
Thus "believing is a relation to things believed, to values of the variable 'y' in the schema 'x believes y', which things have features that determine the intentional features of beliefs."(20) On this account there is no reason to suppose--like (at any rate the early) Quine--that extensionalism
demands the complete elimination of all such mentalist residues, that is to say, all talk of meanings or beliefs which cannot be directly cashed out in extensional terms.(21) What is required, rather, is a treatment of propositional attitudes that renders them perspicuous (or nonopaque) by bringing them within the extended range of a compositional semantics.
(Philosophers--unlike historians--have always interested themselves in what would be the case if things were in some way different.)(1) (2) They provided an important occasioning factor in the collapse of the nominalistic extensionalism
central to the logical positivism that flourished in the middle third of the twentieth century.