"From Sinks to Webs: Critical Social Science after the Fact-Value Distinction
." Canadian Review of Sociology /Revue canadienne de sociologie 54(4):423-44.
As in the works written since After Virtue, MacIntyre's main concern in his new book is the fact-value distinction
. "I have feelings about what would please me and that's what I value and what motivates me," is an expression we would expect from someone who hews to this distinction.
Law scholars debate the fact-value distinction
in interdisciplinary studies of law.
In this new volume targeted to undergraduate students of economics, James Halteman and Edd Noell lament the fact-value distinction
found in modern economics.
The discussion of these objections gives particular attention to the legacy of Hume's fact-value distinction
In my reading, Ward employs the fact-value distinction
as a surrogate for the unresolved science-religion demarcation, and he thereby ignores one of the bigger philosophical questions of the last century (i.e., whether this is a legitimate distinction).
(It is not necessarily the case that Hailer subscribes to a fictitious distinction between action and belief just because his argument relies on it--he could be attempting a shrewd manipulation of belief.) Haller's arguments depend, furthermore, on additional, related and similarly questionable distinctions, including a fact-value distinction
which treats modem science as if it possessed moral neutrality and did not presuppose certain goods, as well as a distinction between ethics and prudence that forgets that prudence is a virtue that is always entangled with purposes.
"To argue from the existence of a fact-value distinction
to the obligation to take responsibility for our actions is to violate the fact-value distinction
Cora Diamond's "`We Are Perpetually Moralists': Iris Murdoch, Fact, and Value" maintains a steady attention to the fact-value distinction
so important in analytic philosophy, and especially to the publicized dispute between R.
Schmitt and Copenhaver make a plausible case that many supposedly modern philosophical issues - the embeddedness of thought in language, the need to choose among incommensurate conceptual schemes, the problem of the fact-value distinction
- have roots going back to the Renaissance.
Some of the implications are interesting, especially the author's view that a satisfying theory of content has to appeal to notions of value, and his related attack on the fact-value distinction
. But unless the theory can produce an analysis of at least some legitimately intentional concepts, the value of these far-reaching claims is largely mooted.
Lang's convictions are precise: human beings are not objects, and, in descriptions of human beings, the fact-value distinction
fails; morality is more important than law; there are dimensions of human existence which fall outside the scope of the political; corruption in people and in politics goes hand in hand with a corruption of language.