hypothetical imperative


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hypothetical imperative

KANT's term for advice about action which has the form ‘if you wish to achieve X, do Y’. Such advice, based on empirical evidence, is not binding, but optional. Thus it lacks the force of a categorical imperative, Kant's term for any moral injunction which can be held to possess a universal force. The basis of such categorical imperatives (e.g. ‘thou shall not kill’) is to ‘act only on the maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law’.
References in periodicals archive ?
Consider for a moment Kant's categorical and hypothetical imperatives.
If you thought you could avoid normativity by rejecting categorical imperatives and embracing only hypothetical imperatives, think again.
1) On this point, see Stephen Darwall, Impartial Reason (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), 15, 44-50; Patricia Greenspan, "Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives," Journal of Philosophy 73 (1975): 259-276; R.
While this Note takes a contrary position, most believe that other moral goals (such as "thou shall not steal") are not part of a hypothetical imperative.
An excellent example of the hypothetical imperative applied to ethics can be found in the works of Aristotle.
And because it is always a matter of empirical fact what specific ends some particular agent has, we cannot know a priori whether a given hypothetical imperative is valid for that particular agent.
Hypothetical imperatives, on the other hand, can be tied to the promotion of subjective value.
Laudan's 'normative naturalism' claims to account for the success of science by construing theories and other claims as methodological rules interpreted as defeasible hypothetical imperatives for securing cognitive ends.
He suggests that even though methodological rules may be stated in the grammatical form of categorial imperatives, they are properly construed as hypothetical imperatives.
Even though institutional norms appear to take a categorical form, they must in fact harbor a hypothetical imperative somewhere in the chain of supporting reasons (1977, pp.
lets only hypothetical imperatives become possible: I ought to do something because I will something else.
Hill's article focuses on the earlier stages of Kant's argument that there must be principles of rational conduct other than desire-based hypothetical imperatives, in which Kant argues that rational wills have autonomy.