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the idealist movement in philosophy that considers intuition to be the sole reliable means of cognition. Although the intuitionist tendency is characteristic of many philosophers and philosophical trends of the past, intuitionism as a definite movement arose at the turn of the century. It is, in particular, a type of reaction to the spread of a rationalistic way of thought, which is based on the mechanistic and positivistic conception of scientific knowledge and on the limitation of experience exclusively to the sphere of sense perception. As a variety of irrationalism, intuitionism is opposed to the philosophy of dialectical materialism. Two forms of intuitionism can be distinguished. For the first, anti-intellectual form, the opposition of intuition and intellect is characteristic, as in H. Bergson (France) and the philosophy of life as a whole. The second form tries to unite intuition and intellect, as in the Russian philosophers N. O. Losskii, S. L. Frank, and E. N. Trubetskoi; the French neo-Thomists E. Gilson and J. Maritain; and, in part, E. Husserl and the phenomenological school—M. Scheler, N. Hartmann (Germany), and other philosophers.

Bergson contrasts intuition to discursive, logical thinking or logical knowledge. He interprets intuition as the immediate merging of subject and object, the overcoming of the opposition between them. In the biological versions of the philosophy of life (for example, in the German philosoher L. Klages) intuition verges on instinct, giving direct knowledge of an object without the aid of consciousness.

Representatives of the second tendency of intuitionism strive to go beyond the bounds of immediate sense experience and propose that philosophy base itself on a special kind of experience—mental (particularly “religious”) experience. Dialectical materialism, while criticizing the exaggerated role that intuitionism assigns to intuition in cognition, looks upon intuition as an organic moment in the cognitive process, acting in unison with discursive thinking.

References in periodicals archive ?
Similarly but importantly distinct, in intuitionist logic: "AAB" is defined as proven when A is proven and B is proven; "AvB" is defined as proven when A is proven or B is proven; "[logical not]A" is defined as proven when there exists a proof that there is no proof of A; and "A [right arrow] B" is defined as proven when there exists a construction that, provided any proof of A, may be applied to provide a proof of B (Non-classical, 100).
But even if it is, that should be cold comfort to the intuitionist, since the conventionalist can explain cross-cultural agreement without positing universals: she can say that cross-cultural similarities between norms are evidence of circumstantial similarities (and, of course, similarities between the convention-makers themselves).
6), focused on disputes between an intuitionist and a classical logician about whether instances of LEM should be counted as logical truths.
afferent to their correlated proposition but also the very protection of the logical principles in the "non-standard contexts mentioned by Aristotle (the sentences about the contingent future), by Leibniz (the sentences about continuum and its limit), and systematically by the intuitionist mathematicians (sentences about the infinite).
More important, Roland's association with mechanical elevation suggests that Fulton, who is also venerated by the Intuitionists, may be similarly misguided.
A Social Intuitionist Approach to Moral Judgment >>, Psychological Review, 108 : 814-834.
The claim that intuitionism draws its rules from the study of mentally effective operations is fair enough; indeed, on this point Badiou is in consensus with most active intuitionists (including, it seems, both Brouwer and Heyting).
The empiricism of the Baconians differed markedly from the intuitionist view of reason in transcendentalism, and Orestes Brownson's conception of intuition differed from Emerson's and performed different functions in his understanding of religion.
Then a careful analysis is given of the similarities and dissimilarities between Wittgenstein's new conception of proofs by induction and those of the intuitionists on quantification (thereby setting the stage for a proper discussion of Wittgenstein's finitism to follow).
For the intuitionists, mathematics constitutes a magnificent edifice built by human reason.
Ever since Henry Sidgwick's critique of the morality of "common sense," intuitionists have been chary of proclaiming categorical or absolute moral obligations--which is why they all embrace W.
Both traditional intuitionists and Dummettians argue that mathematical statements should be understood in terms of proof conditions, rather than mind-transcendent truth conditions.