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the idealist movement in philosophy that considers intuition to be the sole reliable means of cognition. Although the intuitionist tendency is characteristic of many philosophers and philosophical trends of the past, intuitionism as a definite movement arose at the turn of the century. It is, in particular, a type of reaction to the spread of a rationalistic way of thought, which is based on the mechanistic and positivistic conception of scientific knowledge and on the limitation of experience exclusively to the sphere of sense perception. As a variety of irrationalism, intuitionism is opposed to the philosophy of dialectical materialism. Two forms of intuitionism can be distinguished. For the first, anti-intellectual form, the opposition of intuition and intellect is characteristic, as in H. Bergson (France) and the philosophy of life as a whole. The second form tries to unite intuition and intellect, as in the Russian philosophers N. O. Losskii, S. L. Frank, and E. N. Trubetskoi; the French neo-Thomists E. Gilson and J. Maritain; and, in part, E. Husserl and the phenomenological school—M. Scheler, N. Hartmann (Germany), and other philosophers.

Bergson contrasts intuition to discursive, logical thinking or logical knowledge. He interprets intuition as the immediate merging of subject and object, the overcoming of the opposition between them. In the biological versions of the philosophy of life (for example, in the German philosoher L. Klages) intuition verges on instinct, giving direct knowledge of an object without the aid of consciousness.

Representatives of the second tendency of intuitionism strive to go beyond the bounds of immediate sense experience and propose that philosophy base itself on a special kind of experience—mental (particularly “religious”) experience. Dialectical materialism, while criticizing the exaggerated role that intuitionism assigns to intuition in cognition, looks upon intuition as an organic moment in the cognitive process, acting in unison with discursive thinking.

References in periodicals archive ?
Cloth, $90.00--Knowing Moral Truth by Christopher Kulp takes a new approach in arguing for an intuitionist moral realism.
The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Similarly but importantly distinct, in intuitionist logic: "AAB" is defined as proven when A is proven and B is proven; "AvB" is defined as proven when A is proven or B is proven; "[logical not]A" is defined as proven when there exists a proof that there is no proof of A; and "A [right arrow] B" is defined as proven when there exists a construction that, provided any proof of A, may be applied to provide a proof of B (Non-classical, 100).
Yet, the reference to the value course of the dyadic functions allows us not only to find out the epistemic levels (contingency--certainty; individual-context--generic-context ; etc.) afferent to their correlated proposition but also the very protection of the logical principles in the "non-standard contexts mentioned by Aristotle (the sentences about the contingent future), by Leibniz (the sentences about continuum and its limit), and systematically by the intuitionist mathematicians (sentences about the infinite).
Now antirealist intuitionists wish to insist that LEM can no longer serve in their system of logic as it does in classical logic.
Most important, like other Intuitionists she harbors millennial expectations for the second elevation that recall those of the second coming of Christ.
This limitation was, in part, imposed by the fact that the intuitionists could only treat multiples (e.g., subsets of [[omega].sub.0] defining reals) as being effectively infinite if a constructively knowable law expressed their principle of generation.
The empiricism of the Baconians differed markedly from the intuitionist view of reason in transcendentalism, and Orestes Brownson's conception of intuition differed from Emerson's and performed different functions in his understanding of religion.
It starts by describing the intuitionist views of Weyl and (the late) Ramsey on quantification.
Ever since Henry Sidgwick's critique of the morality of "common sense," intuitionists have been chary of proclaiming categorical or absolute moral obligations--which is why they all embrace W.