liar paradox


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liar paradox

(philosophy)
A sentence which asserts its own falsity, e.g. "This sentence is false" or "I am lying". These paradoxical assertions are meaningless in the sense that there is nothing in the world which could serve to either support or refute them. Philosophers, of course, have a great deal more to say on the subject.

["The Liar: an Essay on Truth and Circularity", Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, Oxford University Press (1987). ISBN 0-19-505944-1 (PBK), Library of Congress BC199.P2B37].
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First, however, we quickly investigate the liar paradox (in which a liar says that he is a liar), first published in [12].
If, on the other hand, one accepts the proposition that actual truth of an asserted content is compatible with classifying something as a lie, then it is not immediately obvious that specimens classifiable as liar paradox really exist.
The observation that provable instances of (T) are true is trivial and has no relevance for Tarski's proposal of how to solve the Liar paradox.
Campbell does not see this as a shortcoming because he takes the usual understanding of the Liar Paradox to be one of several symptoms resulting from a misguided allegiance to "the linguistic conception of truth.
9) I earlier said something about the connection between the paradox of desire and the liar paradox.
Let us illustrate how this allows us to cope with puzzles such as the liar paradox while avoiding dialetheism.
Dick's We Can Remember It For You Wholesale, Total Recall's identity swapping premise cautions us against the willingness to realign reality via our identification with Hollywood fantasies To quote Schwarzenegger's own embrace of the liar paradox within Total Recall, 'it's the best mind fuck yet
Then I shall turn to the Liar paradox, and discuss three themes central to recent work on it: partiality, context dependence, and the revision theory of truth.
Epimenides is reputed to be the first to record the liar paradox (also called Epimenides' paradox), in which a sentence that is grammatically correct (such as "I am lying") can be logically nonsensical.
This paper compares two proposed solutions to the liar paradox, both of which involve revisions to classical semantics.
The standard paradoxes of self-reference, such as Burali-Forti's Paradox, the Liar Paradox, Berry's Paradox, have a common underlying structure.
The fairly standard response to liar sentences, which has been voiced by a number of philosophers who work directly on the Liar paradox, but can also be heard from philosophers who do not work directly on that paradox, is that liar sentences do not express propositions.