liar paradox


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liar paradox

(philosophy)
A sentence which asserts its own falsity, e.g. "This sentence is false" or "I am lying". These paradoxical assertions are meaningless in the sense that there is nothing in the world which could serve to either support or refute them. Philosophers, of course, have a great deal more to say on the subject.

["The Liar: an Essay on Truth and Circularity", Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, Oxford University Press (1987). ISBN 0-19-505944-1 (PBK), Library of Congress BC199.P2B37].
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According to Peter (and Veronique) Eldridge-Smith, who originally formulated the problem in [2] and further elaborated on it in [3], the Pinocchio paradox is an improved version of the classical liar paradox, where any attempt to assign a binary truth value to the statement: "This sentence is not true" leads to the conclusion that the statement is true if and only if it is false.
Plural Signification and the Liar Paradox. Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, 145(3), pp.
No need exists to pursue the issue further in the present context because only the following fact matters here: Even if one grants, maybe only for the sake of argument, that non-presenting reference to content is a characteristic or even indispensable feature of items that engender paradoxes of truth it would be at best a gross exaggeration to contend that the investigated passage of the SS offers us 'an interesting and elegant solution to paradoxes of truth' or to 'the family of paradoxes to which the Liar Paradox belongs'.
I see no place in Tarski's writings which could justify the view that he "clearly imposed, etc." The observation that provable instances of (T) are true is trivial and has no relevance for Tarski's proposal of how to solve the Liar paradox. On the other hand, the provability of T-sentences matters very much and the role of this fact has the best illustration in the problem of the definability of the T-predicate.
But to the reader who is looking for a solution to the Liar Paradox, as we usually understand it, those arguments will be unsatisfactory: They do not tell us how to consistently answer the question of whether the item referred to by a (strengthened) Liar sentence satisfies the predicate that that sentence expresses.
(9) I earlier said something about the connection between the paradox of desire and the liar paradox. There is a dual problem: the problem of the truth-teller.
The "liar paradox" ("All Creatans are liars," said the Creatan) especially has continued to inspire work: see Martin (1970, 1984), and Barwise and Etchemendy (1987).
Let us illustrate how this allows us to cope with puzzles such as the liar paradox while avoiding dialetheism.
One way to understand how Heloise's confession of hypocrisy can take advantage of such a logical loophole is by comparing it to the "liar paradox," an "insoluble" logical puzzle that, while not contemporary with Heloise and Abelard, was much discussed by logicians from the late twelfth century onwards.
Epimenides the Cretan manufactured the Liar Paradox, the self-contradictory act of making true lies out of false truths.
The Liar paradox figures prominently in this collection, but is not alone.
What happens to the dialethic solution of the liar paradox if one stipulates that "true" and "untrue" determine complementary and thereby disjoint sets (Sainsbury 1995, p.