Here, the comparison to predatory pricing conducted by oligopolists
i] denotes the marginal cost of production for the oligopolist
Under these assumptions, the analysis will be based on the Pigouvian model of third-degree price discrimination (Pigou 1932) within a market structure characterized by n identical Cournot oligopolists
That is, the prices of one oligopolist
could be brought into line with costs and others would be certain to follow.
Let m(P) now be the inverse demand function faced by the domestic oligopolist
for a given level of production of its foreign competitor.
As the number of consumers who are informed about competitive prices increases, the oligopolist
should be increasingly concerned about the chance that a price differential will be discovered (see Stigler 1961; Salop and Stiglitz 1977; Wilde and Schwartz 1979).
Rutenberg (1988) developed a model of Canadian firm behavior where dominant firms and oligopolist
market leaders attempt to limit the sales volume of its rival firms through "umbrella pricing.
3) The Mulligan and Fik papers theoretically examine the degree to which the pricing behavior of a spatial oligopolist
is linked to the attributes not only of the closest rival, but also to the attributes of all rivals in the market area.
We assume that the rival firm is an oligopolist
with the MNF's downstream branch but takes price as given when buying the input.
This rationalization process consists of each oligopolist
searching to establish the relevant correlation for him between price and quantity and applying the results obtained in his market policy [1934, 95] Economic variables are no longer stable nor do individuals assume them to be constant and beyond their influence.
This was done in concert, the suit charged, because each oligopolist
understood that the successful entry of a new competitor in its own local monopoly markets would encourage new competitive entry into the local monopoly markets of the other oligopolists
; new competition for one, in other words, would encourage new competition for all, which would dissipate the local monopoly dominance of each.
Instead we can take the equilibrium outputs produced by an oligopolist