A single excluding oligopolist
generally faces some pressure to
behaving in a legal, consciously parallel fashion could achieve high and rising prices, even as costs remained stable, by engaging in price leadership.
This means that at any stage each firm behaves as a Cournotian oligopolist
on residual demand.
When an industry experiences global consolidation, the emerging international oligopolists
should find themselves facing an environment of multimarket contacts.
Collusive agreements reduce the total number of decision units operating in the downstream and upstream markets and, thus, the corresponding number of oligopolists
in each of them.
Refusing peering can be seen as anti-competitive: refusing peering is to make the peering arrangement an entry barrier with a few oligopolists
using their market power to decide the peering arrangement.
Focusing more on how firms interact with each other, Carlin, Lobo, and Viswanathan (2004) argue that a market with a few large players will be stable most of the time, as firms choose optimally to act as cooperating oligopolists
such markets, where it may be possible for oligopolists
to reach a
Not all oligopolists
rely on the exercise of monopsony, but a large and growing contingent of today's largest firms are built to do just that.
A similar expression can be obtained from standard one-stage non-cooperative oligopolists
with foreign competition, (12) the difference lies in the concentration index used for this expression, while theoretical results would yield an expression with the Herfindahl concentration index, equation (8) uses the four firm concentration ratio.
128) An oligopolist
, by contrast, is motivated to minimize costs by competition from other oligopolists
and from fringe competitors.
base pricing decisions in part on anticipated reactions to such decisions; they are "interdependent" with respect to their pricing.