scientific realism


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scientific realism

(PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE) the assumption (Bhaskar, 1975, 1979), that a ‘real world’ exists independently of our senses, and that the objects of scientific thought are ‘real structures, irreducible to the events they generate’ (see also EXPLANATORY MECHANISM; compare REALISM). In presenting this as a new TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT, Bhaskar has had considerable influence on methodological thinking in modern sociology, especially in providing support for 'structural explanations’ and in combatting EMPIRICISM. What is not clear, however, is whether scientific realism carries quite the specific implications suggested by Bhaskar (e.g. support for MARX against WEBER or DURKHEIM).
References in periodicals archive ?
His topics include between innocence and commitment: speculation and experience, commitment to reason and to scientific realism, humanism and the cosmic agent, and commitment to God.
This topic has the potential to bridge the gulf now existing between analytical and historical approaches to philosophy, drawing illuminating comparisons between medieval realism and contemporary analytic views over universals (especially the so-called scientific realism of david armstrong, michael louxs constituent ontology, and the new essentialism of brian ellis).
Yet, in addition, many philosophers have also held that underdetermination poses a specific problem for scientific realism. (40)
Pessimists constructed the old pessimistic induction (Laudan, 1977; Putnam, 1978) and the new pessimistic induction (Stanford, 2006) to rebut scientific realism, the view that successful scientific theories are (approximately) true.
Can we accept scientific realism while rejecting mathematical realism?
The Role of Existential Quantification in Scientific Realism, SUKI FINN
M., 1978, Universals and Scientific Realism, 2 Vols.
Extensive philosophical debates about scientific realism have centred around the issue of whether or not we are justified in inferring that those unobservable entities are correctly described by scientific theories (see, e.g., Ladyman, 2016).
The philosophy of computational social science described above is a form of scientific realism: it takes the discoveries made by scientific consensus to be real, or more real than the contents of the perspectives of those who are not participating in the scientific social process.
Armstrong, David Malet, Universais and Scientific Realism (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978)
KARL POPPER'S SCIENTIFIC REALISM, AS COHERENT AS IT IS POSSIBLE

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