In the technical, legal vocabulary of a Kantian deduction analyzed by Dieter Henrich, a transcendental argument
validates or legitimates a form of cognition by uncovering its origin or a priori conditions of possibility.
On Kant's Response to Hume: The Second Analogy as Transcendental Argument
. En Transcendental Arguments
If thinking comes after sensing, as it does phylogenetically and ontogenetically, then the thing-at-itself is an after-thought, as are all results of transcendental arguments
; an after-thought about a merely logical antecedent.
However, unlike other forms of philosophical argumentation, "the interest of a transcendental argument
clearly does not lie in the formal derivation of the conclusion, which is trivial; but in the production of the knowledge of the major premiss (i.e.
Even if the transcendental argument
here presented is convincing and the modal proof of this paper is sound in S5, we have to consider further problems, because ultimately founded entities must not depend on contingent conditions.
While D'Oro has done a masterful job of setting the record straight on the matter of Collingwood's alleged conversion to historicism, as well as clarifying Collingwood's theory of metaphysics as a form of transcendental argument
and explaining how Collingwood's theory of historical explanation comes together as the logical outcome of his philosophy of mind, more attention needs to be given to the relationship between Collingwood's theory of human self-making and his claim that, when properly practiced, history is a school of practical and political wisdom.
Then the transcendental argument
from (A) to (B) would show that once the skeptic has granted the A-claim, he must concede the truth of the B-claim.
To justify such a presupposition requires "a transcendental argument
from the very possibility of the projects of communication and inquiry" (p.
What is a priori about this deepest level is that it amounts to a certain dialectical transcendental argument
that the sphere of ownness presupposes that of a fundamental otherness, that what is own can be understood only as an (anonymous) other, and this relation of self-other must already obtain intrasubjectively, or in Taipale's words: "Our experience of others as objects is preceded by the 'Urgemeinschaftung of our intentional life, the Ineinander of the others in us,' and the actual other is a particular exemplar of this anonymous anybody implicated in our perception." I agree that this a priori intersubjectivity must be assumed before any concrete other (at the level of the social, shared world) can become encountered.
In light of this restriction, a transcendental argument
is called for, which would demonstrate that the necessary conditions for positing this question include the subjection of this reality to natural laws.
Willatt specifies the requirements for the transcendental argument
enabled by the architectonic method: 'the argument must be inclusive and internalizing, providing the conditions of the possibility of experience exhaustively and so without remainder.
To his credit, Craig does appeal to some argument, specifically, to a Kantian transcendental argument
. According to Craig, the Kantian or neo-Kantian philosopher 'defends the validity of the causal proposition as the expression o the operation of a mental a priori category of causality which the mind brings to experience'  p.